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More than twenty legislatures reserve a portion of seats for ethnic minority groups, often 
in an attempt to prevent violent conflict and redress historical oppression. The intention 
of reserved seats coincides with indigenous group objectives—to achieve political 
representation while maintaining autonomy. Yet the formation and electoral success of 
indigenous parties does not always follow adoption of a reserved seat system. I explain 
this inconsistency by taking reserved seats as a necessary but insufficient condition of 
indigenous party formation, and arguing that two additional conditions must be met to 
motivate indigenous groups to form a viable party: the failure of the existing party system 
to respond to group interests and the failure of grievance resolution mechanisms to fairly 
adjudicate disputes between indigenous groups and the state. I compare this model of 
indigenous party formation to three case studies—Colombia, New Zealand, and 
Taiwan—each with a reserved seat system for indigenous peoples but nonetheless 
exhibiting different levels of indigenous party formation and success. This research 
makes three significant contributions: it explores how indigenous groups strategically 
balance autonomy and participation; it suggests reconsidering how indigenous party 
formation and reserved seats are conceptualized by rational choice approaches; and it 
points to new ways of thinking about how elites can manipulate reserved seats to 
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“The Spanish Inquisition, the French Revolution, the Battle of Waterloo, Plato, Aristotle, 
Socrates – we know about all those things; we know about those people. So what of Toi 
Kairākau, of Rauru? What of my history, my tangata whenua-ness, my 1,000 missing 
years?” 





For nearly 140 years following the creation of reserved seats for indigenous Maori by 
European colonists in New Zealand, no viable Maori party emerged. Discriminatory 
barriers to the full participation of Maori voters were present for much of this period, but 
at the same time many Maori associated the special electorates and participation in 
elections more generally with colonialism. Preferring instead to take direct action and 
advocate for Maori self-determination outside of democratic institutions, even when 
electoral barriers were removed in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century a distinctly Maori 
party failed to form. Yet, in 2004, Labour MP Tariana Turia defected and founded the 
Maori Party after the governing Labour Party rejected a court ruling in favor of 
indigenous rights. 
                                                 
1
 The full quotation, from White (2016, 185): “The Spanish Inquisition, the French Revolution, the Battle 
of Waterloo, Plato, Aristotle, Socrates – we know about all those things; we know about those people. So 
what of Toi Kairākau, of Rauru? What of my history, my tangata whenua-ness, my 1,000 missing years? 
Toi Kairākau crossed the Pacific and came to New Zealand. At the same time, Eric the Red was expelled 
from Iceland and voyaged to Greenland. Toi Kairākau is my ancestor; he still lives, in me. His history and 
genealogy is my history and genealogy, my bonding to these islands of Aotearoa. Toi’s son was Rauru; his 
son was Whātonga. From Whātonga came Tahaiti; from Tahaiti came Uenuku. At the time of Uenuku, 
William of Normandy conquered England and became King William I. From Uenuku came Ruatapu; from 
Ruatapu came Rākeiora; from Rakeiora came Tama ki Te Hau. Those are my ancestors – tangata whenua – 
and the ancestor Tama ki Te Hau lived at the time of the great military leader Genghis Khan, who 
established the Mongol empire, uniting almost all of Asia and Europe. My genealogy descends to Tama ki 
Te Rā and Tame ki Te Mātangi – and now the Magna Carta is signed on the other side of the world.” 
2 
The story of the formation and electoral victories of the Maori Party begs the 
question of what conditions more generally contribute to indigenous party entry and 
success. Rational choice approaches emphasize the importance of decreasing institutional 
barriers such as costly party registration requirements and high effective electoral 
thresholds. Reserved seats, which work by formally guaranteeing a particular ethnic 
group a minimum number of legislative seats, are one way of decreasing the barriers to 
indigenous representation while maintaining group autonomy (Bird 2014).
2
 Yet viable 
indigenous parties do not always follow directly from reserved seat adoption (Van Cott 
2003). 
I argue that reserved seats, while functioning as an important reduction in the cost 
of indigenous party entry, are not sufficient to induce indigenous party entry. I draw 
attention to a second cost factor which scholars have left so far critically unaddressed: 
indigenous group assimilation into mainstream political competition and democratic 
institutions. In the perceptions of indigenous populations, these institutions often carry 
with them the legacy of settler colonization and assimilation policies (Murphy 2008). 
Historically, assimilation policies included the use of education to alienate children from 
indigenous communities and culture, the suppression of arts and traditions, the extension 
of state jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters to what were internal indigenous affairs, 
and exchanging indigenous land for citizenship which had the double effect of “opening 
up tribal lands for white settlement and liquidating the tribe” (Archibald 2006, 10). For 
                                                 
2
 Bird (2014) identifies three “families” of ethnic quotas: threshold exemptions or proportional seat 
allocation among ethnic parties, special voting districts which require ethnic group membership to legally 
cast a vote, and party-list quotas or best-loser mechanisms which incorporate ethnic group representatives 
into pan-ethnic parties. My use of the term ‘reserved seats’ is to indicate the effect of the first two families; 
that is, a minimum number of seats are in one way or another legally dedicated to the representation of 
ethnic groups. The third family of ethnic quotas is more likely to formally and functionally fail this 
standard and so I exclude it from my definition of reserved seats (Htun 2004). 
3 
contemporary indigenous groups, government attempts to extend the state’s legal 
authority into the indigenous domain in ways reflective of this past constitute what I term 
an “assimilationist challenge.” In liberal democracies, indigenous groups facing an 
assimilationist challenge have the option to acquiesce or to fight by filing a complaint 
with an institution of horizontal accountability, such as a court, or by forming a political 
party and attempting to directly influence policy. 
Just as Maori MP Pita Sharples called for serious attention to the history and 
identity of indigenous peoples in the opening quotation, I center colonial legacies and 
indigenous perspectives in the development of a theory of indigenous party entry and 
success. From this analytical foundation, the decision of indigenous groups to form a 
party is determined by the balance of assimilation costs and rights preservation. 
Indigenous groups are pressured into this dilemma by established mainstream parties that 
benefit from the regime legitimacy and stability effects provided by small ethnic party 
entry. I conceptualize these interactions as a strategic game played by an established 
mainstream party and an indigenous group with the potential to either form a new party 
or acquiesce to government demands for assimilation. 
A key implication of my model is that indigenous party formation can be induced 
by strategic disruption of grievance resolution mechanisms dedicated to protecting 
indigenous group rights and adjudicating reparations settlements. That is, governing 
parties willing to manufacture a failure of horizontal accountability can change the 
decision calculus of indigenous groups such that party formation and entry into electoral 
competition becomes the least costly alternative for securing group rights and interests. 
On the other hand, my theory suggests that established parties too weak to bear the 
4 
legitimacy cost of rejecting horizontal accountability will back down from their 
assimilationist challenge to indigenous groups. The game of indigenous party entry also 
has important implications for the electoral success of newly formed indigenous parties. 
Specifically, I argue that new indigenous party success is influenced by the reputational 




Before proceeding with the development and testing of this argument, it is helpful to 
more clearly define the theoretical framework and empirical scope which I adopt in this 
study. In this paper, I am primarily concerned with the formation and electoral outcomes 
of indigenous parties in democracies. However, and with some important exceptions (e.g., 
Birnir 2004; Htun & Ossa 2013; Madrid 2005a, 2005b; Murphy 2008; Postero 2007; Rice 
& Van Cott, 2006; Van Cott 2000, 2003, 2007), much of the relevant parties and 
elections literature is focused on the representation of ethnic minorities. This body of 
research encompasses—but is not perfectly coextensive with—the representation of 
indigenous peoples; for example, Turkish immigrants in Germany constitute a minority 
ethnic population just as Aboriginal peoples in Canada form an ethnic category but only 
the latter is considered indigenous. The difference underlying this distinction is related to 
social and territorial continuity spanning the precolonial to postcolonial periods. As Cobo 
(1987, 48) explains: 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other 
5 
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. 
They form at present nondominant sectors of society and are determined 
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued 
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems. 
Importantly, these identities are categories which may form the basis of a constructed 
group. Brubaker (2004, 13) makes the argument for distinguishing between categories of 
identity and group identity by pointing to how this assumption permits researchers to 
“attend to the dynamics of group-making as a social, cultural, and political project.” That 
is, taking on a constructivist view of groups enables analysis of how elites strategically 
activate or suppress specific markers of group membership and how indigenous peoples 
contingently identify and behave as a group—and if that group is inclusive of all 
indigenous peoples residing in the state or if the groups are mobilized along distinct tribal 
lines. 
Given the substantive focus of this research it is imperative that a critical 
perspective is maintained in the application of rational choice to its study. Indeed, Spivak 
(1988) warns of the epistemic violence produced through the use of Western ways of 
knowing to theorize and “re-present” subaltern subjects. Declining an unrestrained 
application of the rational choice framework to the analysis of indigenous parties should 
not be interpreted to mean indigenous peoples behave irrationally, but that the 
universalizing and homogenizing assumptions made by rational choice-based theories are 
ultimately inadequate to the task on their own. The general advantages of a rational 
choice approach and game-theoretic models include their encouragement of internal 
validity and assistance in developing theoretical conceptualizations (Moe 1979; Walt 
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1999). Specific to the study of party behavior, game-theoretic models provide an efficient 
tool for representing the interdependent choices and their consequences for parties, on top 
of the fact that this “interaction between established parties and their potential challengers 
takes place in a well-structured environment” (Hug 2001, 39). However, the disembodied 
“gaze from nowhere” fails to account for insights of postcolonial scholarship which are 
founded upon indigenous peoples’ epistemologically advantageous situation of “seeing 
from below” (Haraway 1988, 583-584). This vantage point looks beneath the surface of 
social relations and by this structural positioning “exposes the real relations among 
human beings” (Hartsock 1987, 160), unlike the argued “virtue of rational choice theory” 
which is to pursue “equilibrium results independent of structural peculiarities” (Strøm 
1990, 565). 
Thus, whereas a purely rational choice approach to party entry defines the costs of 
entry as wholly related to electoral institutions and the number of salient issue 
dimensions (e.g., Bernauer & Bochsler 2011; Tavits 2006), adopting a postcolonial lens 
provides visibility to cost factors unique to indigenous groups and the colonial legacy, 
namely assimilation costs. As Chowdhry and Nair (2013, 2-3) note, “being more attentive 
to the imperialist juncture” enables research to better recognize the constructions and 
subversions of intersecting relations of power across race, class, and gender. I therefore 
wrap the development of my theory of strategic indigenous party formation and electoral 





Overview of the Remaining Sections 
The next section reconsiders the institutional constraints on and competing incentives of 
established mainstream parties and indigenous peoples. Drawing on research from both 
rational choice and constructivist traditions, I answer three key questions about 
indigenous party formation and success: When do these parties form and what makes 
them successful (or not)? Is the formation of indigenous parties beneficial and for whom? 
Finally, what roles do horizontal accountability institutions and linked fates—the idea 
that an individual’s life chances and the fate of the group to which that individual belongs 
are interconnected—have in the formation and success of indigenous parties? The 
answers to these questions directly inform the assumptions I make when structuring my 
model of indigenous party entry and success in the following section. 
Section three introduces my model of indigenous party formation and success. A 
conceptual explanation precedes the development of the full game-theoretic model of 
indigenous party entry, which is then followed by my theory of indigenous party success. 
Importantly, the game of indigenous party entry has substantive implications for new 
indigenous party success; a link which has mainly concerned scholars in terms of 
methodology—specifically with regard to selection bias in the sample of new parties used 
in quantitative analyses of new party success—but less so in terms of substantive theory. 
Thus, this section provides not only a novel theory of indigenous party formation and 
success, but also advances a theoretical explanation of the relationship between the two 
phenomena. 
The empirical part of the paper follows in section four. I bring together the 
hypotheses derived from my theory in the previous section for testing using a diverse 
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case study method. The interactions between indigenous peoples, mainstream parties, and 
political institutions are considered for three cases: New Zealand, Colombia, and Taiwan. 
Each case study concludes with an evaluation of the hypotheses in light of the evidence. 
The results generally support my theory of indigenous party formation and success. 
The fifth and final section concludes by identifying some limitations of this 
research, suggesting directions for future research, and describing three key contributions 
of my model of indigenous party formation and success. This research contributes a 
model which incorporates politicization of indigenous peoples by mainstream parties and 
provides insight on how these indigenous groups strategically balance autonomy and 
political participation. It further suggests how governing elites can leverage reserved 
seats and horizontal accountability institutions to cultivate state legitimacy and enforce 
indigenous group assimilation. Finally, the model gives an example of how rational 
choice approaches generally, and theories of strategic party entry specifically, 
conceptualize indigenous party behavior in a way which more accurately reflects the 
structural inequalities indigenous groups face in postcolonial democracies. I argue that 
new approaches sensitive to indigenous preferences and postcolonial theory are needed 
for, first, the design of institutions and policies meant to improve regime stability and 
reduce ethnic conflict, and, second, rational choice as discourse. 
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II. Reevaluating Assumptions: Constraints and Incentives 
 
 
In order to clarify the structure of the game of indigenous party formation and its 
implications for the electoral success of new indigenous parties, I first engage the 
theoretical tensions surrounding the representation of ethnic minority groups. These 
debates over the empirical and normative causes and consequences of ethnic party entry 
and success point toward the need to revise the assumptions held by rational choice 
approaches to the question of party formation as it has been posed until now in general 
terms. Accounting for constructivist and postcolonial arguments in the reevaluation of 
rational choice literature suggests that its potential for application to the study of 
indigenous group representation and indigenous parties depends on modifying 
institutional constraints and incentive structures so that they more accurately reflect the 
relationship between the state, major parties, and historically marginalized indigenous 
groups. 
This review suggests, in brief, that the electoral system mediates the relationship 
between social cleavages and the party system, which is in turn influenced by the special 
conditions of ethnic minority reserved seats and the responsiveness of parties to ethnic 
group demands. However, different groups are likely to make correspondingly different 
demands of their representatives, but the salience of group identity as well as issue 
dimensions can be manipulated by political elites seeking an advantage in party 
competition. The resulting ethnic mobilizations and tensions have important 
consequences for regime stability and legitimacy, and these effects are interlinked with 
10 
ethnic minority assimilation and autonomy. These benefits and costs are readily 
accessible through mainstream parties’ interactions with horizontal accountability 
institutions which, to varying extents, are assigned to resolve disputes between the state 
and indigenous peoples. 
 
When do Indigenous Parties Form and Succeed? 
Rational choice and political opportunity approaches to party entry have clashed over the 
sufficiency of permissive electoral systems compared to the necessity of political 
mobilizations of social groups in their respective explanations of the formation of 
electorally viable parties. Under a rational choice framework, the decision for new party 
entry is structured by the electoral institutional environment, and defined by the 
interaction of the benefits of office with the probability of electoral support less the cost 
of entry (Tavits 2006). The costs include registration rules (fees, signature requirements) 
and the threshold of exclusion (minimum share of votes needed to qualify for a seat in the 
legislature). Hence, higher district magnitudes
3
 which functionally lower the vote quota 
for winning a seat are considered by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) to be the most 
important factor in explaining party formation and sustainability, although they qualify 
that this effect is conditional upon the number of issue dimensions with which parties can 
align themselves. Ordeshook and Shvetsova also find that single member districts render 
party systems impervious to underlying ethnic heterogeneity. Indeed, many scholars (e.g., 
Cox 1997; Harmel & Robertson 1985; Lijphart 1994; Taagepera & Shugart 1989) 
emphasize the explanatory power of district magnitude in accounting for new party entry 
                                                 
3
 District magnitude refers to the number of legislative seats in an electoral district. 
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and success. However, more recent studies have provided nuance to the relationship 
between electoral system proportionality and ethnic party entry by accounting for the 
territorial distribution of politically active ethnic groups relative to district magnitude 
(Bochsler 2011; Lublin 2017; Morelli 2004; Mozaffar et al. 2003) and legal entry 
requirements with spatial conditions, e.g., signatures or local offices in a certain number 
of districts (Birnir 2004). 
For scholars employing a political opportunity framework, the removal of 
institutional barriers may be a necessary—but not always sufficient condition—for 
indigenous party entry (Birnir 2004; Van Cott 2003). Reserved seats for ethnic minority 
groups provide an institutional solution to the typical costs of party entry by restricting 
who can vote, who can be elected, or both, to the underrepresented ethnic group (Bird, 
2014; Bernauer & Bochsler 2011; Rice & Van Cott 2006), but a preceding mobilization 
of an ethnic group demanding representation is key to ethnic party formation and 
viability (Van Cott 2003). This may help explain Lublin and Wright’s (2013) finding that 
while reserved seats are associated with an increase in ethnic minority representation, 
they do not enhance the prospects for ethnoregional party success. 
Thus, elites’ strategic politicization of social cleavages and group identity is an 
essential element in explaining ethnic party formation. In contrast to the sociological 
approach of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), which views social cleavages as fundamental in 
organizing the structure of party competition, constructivist analyses of party systems and 
ethnic cleavages hold that political actors strategically mobilize and depoliticize different 
markers of ethnic identity in order to manipulate the lines of party competition (Torcal & 
Mainwaring 2003). Enyedi (2005, 699) encapsulates the constructivist view of the 
12 
relationship between social cleavages and the structure of party systems with the 
observation that “cleavages would not exist without elites conceptualizing the conflict 
situation.” While not all potential ethnic cleavages become mobilized in the project of 
defining party competition (Mozaffar et al. 2003), a number of scholars have adopted 
constructivist assumptions about variability in the political relevance of different ethnic 
identities to improve upon theories of ethnic group representation and electoral and party 
systems (e.g., Chandra 2005; Enyedi 2005; Htun 2004; Torcal & Mainwaring 2003). 
Further, responsiveness to ethnic group voters once a party achieves 
representation in the legislature has important effects on future party competition. More 
specifically, reserved seats can increase the descriptive representation of ethnic minority 
groups, but the conversion of descriptive representation to substantive representation of 
ethnic group interests depends on the intensity of electoral competition and its tendency 
towards party-centered or candidate-centered campaigns (Bird 2014). Dunning and 
Nilekani (2013) find that party discipline and main parties’ cultivation of a multiethnic 
electoral support base intervenes in the translation of ethnic quotas to ethnic group 
mobilization and representation. Similarly, Madrid (2005b) and Raymond and Arce 
(2011) suggest that main parties often fail to respond to ethnic minority interests, even if 
they have recruited ethnic minority candidates and campaigned on an inclusive platform. 
The lack of main party responsiveness to ethnic group demands, even in the context of 
reserved seats, suggests that mobilized ethnic group voters may support small parties—
especially ethnic parties (Bird 2014; Htun 2004; Madrid 2005b). 
In sum, permissive electoral institutions—typified by high district magnitude and 
a reserved seat system—in combination with an appropriately distributed and sizeable 
13 
ethnic population (in the case of single member districts, concentration of ethnic 
populations is advantageous) and politically mobilized ethnic groups demanding 
representation are facilitative of ethnic party entry and success. However, the ability to 
sustain electoral success is influenced by parties’ translation of descriptive representation 
and campaign promises into policy outcomes that are responsive to ethnic group demands. 
 
Is Indigenous Party Entry Desirable or Not? 
A second thread of scholarly debate surrounds the normative consequences of ethnic 
party formation, and the associated tension between ethnic group assimilation and 
autonomy. These questions are important from the perspectives of both mainstream elites 
and ethnic groups. One of the reasons elites may activate certain markers of ethnic 
identity (e.g., language, religion, race, territory of residence) is not only to secure an 
electoral advantage (Enyedi 2005; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Torcal & Mainwaring 2003), but 
also to cultivate regime legitimacy and stability (Chandra 2005; Madrid 2005a). As Htun 
(2004, 445) notes, reserved seats are often adopted as a “founding compromise” which 
provides groups with “a constitutional share of power, giving [them] an incentive not to 
defect from the existing political regime and undermine the survival of the state.” But 
whether reserved seats function effectively as an instrument of such a grand compromise 
is contested. 
The negative argument holds that partisan competition structured by ethnic 
cleavages portends the disintegration of democratic politics. Ethnic quotas that allow 
voters to self-select into the electorate for ethnic minority reserved seats have been 
observed to produce stronger ethnonationalist mandates, for example, in Croatia and New 
14 
Zealand (Bird 2014). This tendency comports with ethnic outbidding models (Horowitz 
1985; Rabushka & Shepsle 1972) which posit that relatively centrist positions are 
progressively defeated by increasingly extreme parties appealing to ethnic groups and 
entrenching ethnic divisions. The result of this ethnic outbidding process is argued to be 
that either the majority group wins and strips the minority ethnic group of its rights or the 
minority group preemptively engages in political violence against the majority; in either 
case democracy is undermined (Chandra 2005). Madrid (2005a, 161-162) cites critics 
who contend that the emergence of indigenous parties contributes to ethnic conflict and 
democratic instability because the supporting movements clash with Western culture and 
maintain ties with radical leftist groups. 
However, the claim that the representation of ethnic groups is a threat to 
democratic regime stability has come under scrutiny and, for some researchers, been 
turned on its head. Chandra (2005) argues that the primordialist assumptions of the ethnic 
outbidding model gives way to further assumptions of homogenous ethnic group 
identities and interests which obscure the benefits to politicizing ethnicity and the 
formation of parties drawing on multiple and fluid ethnic identities. The 
institutionalization of ethnic cleavages allows parties to credibly campaign on platforms 
which do not challenge the regime, thus bringing ethnic competition back towards the 
center. Other empirical research finds that party system fragmentation due to a 
proliferation of mono-ethnic parties is constrained by resource and constituent 
availability, prompting multiethnic parties to develop instead and reducing overall 
fragmentation of the party system (Raymond 2015). Consequently, it is possible that an 
emergent indigenous party comes to represent multiple tribes on the basis of their 
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common relationship to a history of colonization and shared experiences contemporary 
discrimination—an identity that cuts across tribal associations and that has been activated 
by mainstream and/or indigenous group elites. Such a dynamic played out, for example, 
in Colombia from the 1970s through the early 1990s when numerous tribes came together 
in support of a general indigenous movement that went on to contest elections and win 
several seats (Troyan 2008; Van Cott 2003). Of course, the politicization of indigenous 
identity is not always so effective at mobilizing tribes to support a common movement or 
party, as happened in Taiwan between the mountain and coastal indigenous tribes (Simon 
2010) or in late 1990s and early 2000s elections in the case of Colombia (Kollman et al. 
2018). 
More generally, the politicization of ethnic groups brings benefits to mainstream 
elites through its favorable relationship with regime stability. The incorporation of ethnic 
minority groups into democratic processes via reserved seats signals inclusion and that 
“the minority community is a full party of society,” but also has the practical effect of 
increasing the potential for cooptation of ethnic group elites by government (Bird 2014, 
19). Further, Bird (2014) notes, symbolic inclusion trades off with legitimizing the status 
quo regime when representatives are more accountable to parties than voters and when 
ethnic quotas require fixed definitions of ethnic group identity to functionally determine 
eligible voters for reserved seat tier elections. Thus, elites have an interest in 
manipulating ethnic cleavages as a strategy for accessing political power and economic 
resources—an incentive which postcolonial institutions inherited as a legacy of the 
colonial period (Mozaffar et al. 2003). 
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Besides these regime stabilizing and legitimation benefits, the potential cost of 
ethnic party entry to major parties tends to be relatively minimal: the fluidity and 
ambiguity of indigenous political identity requires indigenous parties to be inclusive of 
multiple identities and deters radical ethnonationalist platforms. Indeed, where 
indigenous parties have espoused strong hostility towards nonindigenous people, they 
have performed poorly at the polls even among indigenous voters (Madrid 2005a). It is 
therefore possible that, where mainstream elites cannot win indigenous group 
assimilation and access to protected resource by acquiescence, inducing indigenous party 
entry may be a low risk alternative. 
Htun (2004, 441-442) portrays reserved seats differently than do the 
assimilationist and cooptation critiques described above, arguing that “their objective is 
to facilitate autonomy of political communities and electoral success of group-specific 
parties” and that “ethnic groups prefer, and receive, legislative reservations.” According 
to Htun, ethnic groups want independent access to political power—achieving both 
representation and maintaining autonomy—unlike the demand of women for integration 
into existing mainstream parties and (in principle) the adoption of gender quotas to such 
effect. In this sense, the presence of an ethnic minority party in the legislature may serve 
as a check on the executive and other parties against abuses or rollbacks of ethnic group 
rights. Ethnic group demands for reserved seats as institutional insurance for autonomy 
and representation makes sense if ethnic reservations are viewed as a compromise 
ensuring survival of the democratic state. However, Htun’s analysis of this relationship is 
based on the contrast between legislative quotas, which explicitly integrate candidates 
into established parties, and reserved seats, which permit (though not require) 
17 
representation by an independent ethnic party. By glossing over the broader historical 
context and the root preference for self-government of indigenous groups—which would 
become apparent if the precolonial period was held as the reference point—what Htun’s 
analysis actually reveals is elite motivation for the survival of the liberal democratic state. 
Thus, incumbents and other major parties have a vested interest in strengthening the 
regime in which they hold political power and the ability to exploit economic resources 
whereas indigenous groups prefer to maximize autonomy and preserve their rights. 
A question remains, however, about identifying the optimal strategy for 
indigenous groups to achieve autonomy. From the perspective of indigenous peoples, 
answering this question involves addressing their attitude towards participation in the 
formal political institutions of the state, their socioeconomic position and extent of 
dependence on the state, and availability of alternative methods of advocacy. On the one 
hand, the instrumentalization of indigenous group participation by main parties is 
recognized by indigenous peoples and feeds their reticence to support participation in 
elections as a distinct party. This perspective sees no relative advantage in terms of group 
autonomy and rights to forming an indigenous party and influencing policy through the 
normal means of governance established by postcolonial democratic regimes. More 
common is the belief that participation would instead be detrimental to indigenous 
autonomy: 
Indigenous peoples frequently express a profound sense of alienation 
toward these institutions, which carry the stigma of colonial domination. 
Legislative bodies are regarded with particular suspicion, and even 
hostility, conjuring up memories of historic disenfranchisement or 
strategies of electoral inclusion linked to assimilation and the loss of 
indigenous rights and identities. (Murphy 2008, 186) 
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Moreover, the very term “indigenous” only emerged as a label of group identity in the 
latter half of the 20
th
 century, and only then as a construction of nonindigenous actors. 
When the International Labor Organization and other United Nations entities began 
employing the term, indigenous groups responded by referring to themselves as such in 
order to access the rights and protections being established in international agreements 
(Niezen 2000). It therefore seems that in general indigenous peoples have strong 
reservations about advancing the cause of autonomy and group rights through state 
institutions, but are willing to advocate for these objectives in alternative venues such as 
international organizations. 
On the other hand, there are several potential reasons why engaging the state 
through representation in the legislature may be a preferable strategy for indigenous 
groups. First, most indigenous groups are too small and resource poor to support the 
political, economic, and security institutions necessary to sustain a modern independent 
state (Niezen 2000). As a consequence, indigenous peoples are to a significant degree 
reliant on the state for support, and participating in electoral and legislative politics may 
be a useful method of managing this seemingly inevitable dependence (Murphy 2008). 
Second, demographic and economic integration produces a “complex interdependence” 
which leads policy-making and implementation in general, as opposed to specifically and 
only indigenous group-related policies, to be highly relevant to members of indigenous 
groups (Murphy 2008, 198-199). Increases in internal migration (especially in 
coincidence with urbanization), intermarriages, and intermingling of economic activities 
through business relationships and employment have driven the growing interdependence 
between indigenous and nonindigenous communities. These developments lead Murphy 
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(2008) to argue that indigenous group participation in elections forms an important 
component of a multifaceted strategy aimed at achieving indigenous group self-
determination. 
The normative controversy over indigenous party entry from both mainstream and 
indigenous perspective appears to reduce to the rigidity or flexibility of group identities, 
the desire of mainstream parties to increase regime legitimacy and the attitude of 
indigenous groups towards formal political participation, and the conduciveness of the 
institutional environment to realizing each group’s objectives. In the previous part of 
section two, reserved seats were identified as a key electoral institution in facilitating 
ethnic group representation. This part has posited that mainstream parties and elites can 
strategically politicize group identity to encourage participation but that indigenous 
peoples are generally hesitant to involve themselves in elections as a group due to the 
legacy of colonialism and substantial assimilation costs. And although indigenous 
participation on an individual basis may be relatively accepted as structural conditions 
change to deepen the interconnections between indigenous and nonindigenous 
populations, this incremental (and ostensibly voluntary) form of integration does not 
relieve the state of its legal obligations to indigenous groups nor confer the legitimacy 
benefits that are derived from the symbolism of indigenous group participation in 
elections and the legislature. One of the determining factors of indigenous party 
formation is therefore whether the major parties possess the capacity and will to 
manipulate the institutional environment such that the assimilation cost of not forming a 
party is greater than entering electoral competition as an indigenous party. 
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The Strategic Role of Horizontal Accountability and Linked Fates 
The impasse created by the fundamentally opposed preferences held by mainstream 
parties and indigenous groups gives reason for the importance of horizontal 
accountability—formal institutions endowed with the authority to check the actions of 
other state institutions (O’Donnell 1998). In the case of ethnic minority rights, horizontal 
accountability mechanisms are those institutions, such as courts or tribunals, which hear 
and rule on grievances brought by indigenous peoples against the state, and adjudicate 
issues relating to treaty settlements, though there is variation in the availability and 
effectiveness of the means of enforcement (Cleary 2000; Lashley 2000). 
The research discussed in the preceding analysis found that, from the perspective 
of mainstream elites, indigenous party entry is more desirable than not under certain 
conditions. Subsequently, party leaders may have an incentive to violate special rights 
assigned to indigenous groups by treaties or other laws. I argue that these elites may go 
so far as to disregard unfavorable rulings issued by institutions of horizontal 
accountability in response to these violations. The proposition of manufacturing a failure 
of horizontal accountability has two possible benefits for mainstream elites and the 
parties they lead. On the one hand, the indigenous group may acquiesce to the violation 
of their rights—for example to autonomously manage ancestral lands—giving the 
government legal access to lucrative natural resources while the indigenous community 
passively assimilates. On the other hand, the indigenous group may reject the 
transgression, causing the issue along with indigenous group identity to be politicized. In 
this case, mainstream parties have gained the regime legitimacy and stability benefit 
21 
deriving from the entry of an indigenous party. For its part, the new party seeks to restore 
and insulate group rights. 
The decision to create a horizontal accountability failure is thus a strategic one 
involving a cost-benefit calculation by mainstream parties. In comparison to the benefits 
just described, the costs of exceeding the limits of horizontal accountability are derived 
from the threat of punishment that parties responsible for the failure face at the polls 
(Schedler 1999). Research on democratization (O’Donnell 1998, 1999; Powell 2004; 
Weingast 1997) and indigenous movements (Yashar 1999) has observed a 
complementary relationship between vertical and horizontal accountability. As Diamond 
et al. (1999) argue, this relationship extends beyond the relatively conventional 
legislative-executive dynamic to involve more autonomous horizontal accountability 
institutions such as human rights commissions or special tribunals. Hence, a failure of 
horizontal accountability which facilitates policy-making in ways contradicting salient 
indigenous group interests are likely to motivate party formation as an exercise in 
collective action to restore responsiveness to group interests through retrospective 
vertical accountability (O’Donnell 1999; Powell 2004). This expectation is in line with 
empirical evidence which indicates that enhancements to horizontal accountability 
require “a clear public demand for reform” (Schedler 1999, 341). Applied to the issue of 
indigenous party entry, this logic suggests that when a governing party refuses horizontal 
accountability and persists in breaching indigenous group rights, indigenous voters are 
likely to respond by supporting an indigenous party in elections. The mandate being that 
the party will use its policy influence to restore group rights and insulate them against 
future transgressions by strengthening relevant horizontal accountability mechanisms. 
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If the governing party’s politicization of indigenous identity and shift to the 
extreme assimilation side of the autonomy-assimilation issue dimension opens up policy 
space for a competing party to enlarge its electoral base, then why doesn’t the established 
mainstream opposition step in to represent voters abandoned by the governing party’s 
policy shift? According to the spatial model of party competition pioneered by Downs 
(1957), rational vote-seeking parties should take positions which maximize their 
proximity to voters’ preferences relative to competing parties. If the governing party has 
located itself at the assimilation pole of the indigenous rights dimension, then the main 
opposition party could maximize its vote share by taking a less extreme position and 
capturing all votes from the autonomy pole to just before the assimilation pole, 
preemptively capturing voters who may have otherwise supported the entry of an 
indigenous party. However, this analysis relies on assumptions of low distortion in the 
conversion of votes to legislative seats, an increasing competitiveness of elections, and 
that there are a small number of effective parties (Strøm 1990). Consequently, an 
application of Strøm’s (1990) critique of the Downsian vote-maximizing model of party 
behavior suggests that variations in the attributes of electoral institutions and, relatedly, 
party systems influence the propensity for established opposition parties to strategically 
crowd-out potential indigenous parties from entering electoral competition. In addition, 
Meguid (2005) challenges the assumption of equally weighted issue dimensions, arguing 
that issue salience is dynamic and parties strategically manipulate the perceived 
importance of specific issues and that a party’s credibility on a given issue can impact 
voters’ decision-making. As a result, even in the optimal vote-seeking environment of a 
competitive two-party system with little distortion caused by the electoral formula, a 
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mainstream party’s lack of credibility on indigenous issues may work to maintain an 
opening for a viable indigenous party to form. 
The explanation for differences in credibility perceptions, I argue, is the trust 
individuals have in other in-group members to think and act in ways beneficial to the 
group as a first priority. Put differently, the feeling of linked fates among indigenous 
peoples and, separately, among the dominant majority ethnic group, predisposes each 
group to evaluate the credibility of a party through the lens of group identity and welfare. 
The concept of linked fate originated as a description of black Americans’ feeling that 
their individual life chances were strongly tied to those of the racial group as a whole, 
and therefore individual political preferences were shaped in consideration of what was 
best for the group (Dawson 1994). Recent empirical studies suggest that a sense of linked 
fate is prominent in not only black communities but other racial, ethnic, religious, class, 
and gender groups as well (Gay et al. 2016). Moreover, feelings of linked fate and 
consequent political preferences are not necessarily restricted to historically marginalized 
groups. Schildkraut (2017) finds that white Americans also share a sense of linked fate 
and that this feeling influences preferences for white candidates. Taken together this 
evidence suggests that both dominant and subordinate groups generally perceive some 
level of congruence between group utility and individual utility, and that in practice it is 
preferable to be represented by an in-group rather than out-group member. As 
Mansbridge (1999, 643) explains, “the deeper the communicative chasm between a 
dominant and a subordinate group, the more descriptive representation is needed to 
bridge that chasm.” Furthermore, descriptive representatives cannot easily deny their 
group affiliations or fail to consider marginalized perspectives because doing so 
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undermines the justification for their presence and is counter to their own self-interest 
given linked fates (Dovi 2002). Hence, descriptive representation based on shared 
identity and experience is “assumed to promote loyalty” to the group (Mansbridge 1999, 
629). 
Extending this theoretical and empirical evidence to the issue of party credibility 
on the issue of indigenous group assimilation versus autonomy, it seems that indigenous 
voters would assign greater credibility, and subsequently electoral support, to an 
indigenous party. On the other hand, the dominant majority ethnic group is likely to 
support mainstream parties. These cleavages are activated by the governing party’s 
assimilationist challenge to indigenous peoples, and upon the rejection of horizontal 
accountability the literature reviewed here suggests that a newly formed indigenous party 
stands to gain more votes than does an established major opposition party by 
campaigning on a platform of indigenous group autonomy. Indeed, this proposition is 
underwritten by Brubaker’s (2004, 119-120) grounded analysis of assimilationist policy: 
Abundant historical and comparative evidence, moreover, suggests that 
they rarely work, and that they are indeed more likely to strengthen than to 
erode differences, by provoking a reactive mobilization against such 
assimilatory pressures. Analytically, we may have good reason to speak of 
assimilationist policies; but such policies need not have assimilationist 
outcomes. (emphasis in original) 
The remaining question, then, is the location of the cost-benefit threshold which 
motivates established main parties to manufacture a horizontal accountability failure in 
an attempt gain access to economic resources and indigenous group assimilation, and 
under what conditions do indigenous groups respond to this challenge by forming a party 
25 
and contesting elections. I theorize an answer in the next section using game theory to 
develop a formal model of indigenous party entry and success. 
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III. The Modified Game of Indigenous Party Entry and Success 
 
 
In this section, I introduce a formal theory of indigenous party formation followed by 
expectations about the electoral success of newly formed parties. This theory modifies 
the general game-theoretic model of party entry and success introduced by Simon Hug 
(2001). Although Hug intends his model to be generally applicable within the universe of 
consolidated democracies, and to indirectly inform expectations about the success of new 
parties (Hug 2001, 6), I argue the model requires significant modification to be useful in 
explaining indigenous party entry and success. The unique institutional and incentive 
structures surrounding the interactions between established parties and potential 
indigenous parties—that is, reserved seats, competing interests in terms of autonomy and 
assimilation, and horizontal accountability institutions which mediate government action 
and indigenous group rights—fundamentally alter the structure of Hug’s general game 
and thus demand its revision. My theory also improves upon the substantive linkages 
between the conditions of new party entry and new party success, which I describe 
following explication of the game of indigenous party entry. But first, I present a 
conceptual articulation of my theory of indigenous party entry in order to ease the 
transition into the formal model of the game. 
 
A Conceptual Explanation of Indigenous Party Entry 
The central features of the game of indigenous party entry involve the strategic 
interactions of an established mainstream party with decisive influence over policy-
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making, an indigenous population which has the potential to form the base of a new party, 
and an institution which is formerly committed to perform a horizontal accountability 
function. These interactions take place in the context of a democratic regime with 
reserved seats for indigenous peoples. 
As explained in section two, the established mainstream party and the potential 
indigenous party both experience unique incentives and constraints which are structured 
by each group’s relationship to the colonial period and the implications of its legacy for 
the institutions of the contemporary regime. The mainstream party, seeking access to 
protected natural resources or improve regime legitimacy (which subsequently benefits 
the party itself as a result of its dominant position in the status quo regime), has an 
incentive to bring about indigenous peoples’ assimilation, first by indigenous 
acquiescence but if not by motivating the formation of an indigenous party. In pursuing 
these incentives, the mainstream party must consider costs associated with initiating and 
sustaining the assimilation challenge (e.g., financing a public relations campaign and 
legal fees if the policy is challenged in court), the possibility of electoral competition 
with a newly formed indigenous party, and investing the party’s reputation in the 
outcome of the challenge. 
For the potential indigenous party, the dominant strategy is one of cost mitigation. 
Following from the colonization of indigenous peoples and territories and indigenous 
preferences for autonomy given the pre-colonial period as a baseline referent, I do not 
identify any benefit in the matrix of possible payoffs for the potential indigenous party. In 
other words, even the optimal outcome for the indigenous peoples—that is, the rescinding 
of the assimilationist challenge by the established mainstream party—there is no 
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improvement in their situation compared to their status at the beginning of the game. This 
framing keeps the history of colonialism centered in the analysis of indigenous party 
formation and provides a more accurate representation of the power inequalities between 
mainstream parties and indigenous peoples. Since the mainstream party enjoys a 
structural advantage, it is generally able to continue pressing its assimilationist challenge 
onto the potential indigenous party. Thus, it is unlikely (though not impossible) for the 
indigenous peoples’ preferred outcome to occur. Instead, they have the option of 
accepting the assimilation demand or of forming a party to fight the mainstream party in 
elections and influence policy towards indigenous autonomy. I argue that the latter 
strategy is preferred by indigenous groups because it plausibly requires only a temporary 
assimilation cost whereas the former strategy is essentially a permanent (coerced) 
forfeiture of rights. 
My model’s equilibrium outcomes are conditioned by the perceived disposition of 
the horizontal accountability institution towards indigenous rights, the strength of the 
main party issuing the assimilationist challenge, and the cohesiveness of the indigenous 
group. The horizontal accountability institution (a court, special tribunal, or other 
mechanism for resolving indigenous grievances) affects each actor’s strategy by its effect 
on policy legitimacy: whichever actor is on the losing side of the ruling suffers a blow to 
the legitimacy of their position on the indigenous autonomy-assimilation issue dimension, 
whereas the winner gains a legitimacy boost. This effect may be particularly severe for a 
new indigenous party whose raison d`être is advocating for group autonomy. As a result, 
I expect a potential indigenous party to be sensitive to the horizontal accountability 
institution’s reputation and whether it is expected to make a favorable ruling on a given 
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dispute. Where this expectation is low—that is, the horizontal accountability institution is 
predicted by the potential indigenous party to make an unfavorable decision—the 
indigenous group forgoes the legal contestation of the assimilationist challenge and forms 
a party. Conversely, when this expectation is high, the result is indigenous party 
formation after a ruling has been made by the horizontal accountability institution. 
This last outcome requires that either the ruling was unfavorable to the potential 
indigenous party or that it was favorable but the mainstream party refused to be held 
accountable and moved forward with implementation of the assimilation policy anyway. 
If, however, the mainstream party pushing indigenous assimilation is weak—for example, 
by way of electoral vulnerability or expendability as a coalition partner—then it 
determine that the legitimacy penalty received from an adverse decision is too much to 
bear and accepts accountability by withdrawing its assimilationist challenge. In this case, 
no indigenous party is formed. It may also be the case that the main party behaves in the 
same way as the potential indigenous party in regards to the perception of the horizontal 
accountability institution’s reputation. If the main party expects an unfavorable ruling, it 
may proactively rescind its challenge instead of risk losing legitimacy and, subsequently, 
votes. 
Finally, the outcome of the game of indigenous party entry can change when the 
cohesion of the indigenous group varies. Recalling Brubaker’s (2004, 12) distinction 
between category and group, whether an indigenous party forms is influenced by level of 
“groupness” constructed from the category of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples 
vary from country to country in their geographic distribution, number of tribes, the 
intensity of tribal affiliations compared to association as indigenous peoples across tribes, 
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and organizational capacity, among other attributes. To the extent that these factors 
constitute a barrier to collective support for an indigenous movement, indigenous party 
formation becomes less likely (and the electoral success of such a party even more so). 
On the other hand, a unified indigenous population mobilized against the mainstream 
party’s assimilation policy is more likely to result in the formation of an indigenous party. 
 
The Baseline Model of Indigenous Party Entry 
In this part, I formalize the conceptual arguments put forth above in a game-theoretic 
model of indigenous party entry.
4
 Both the established mainstream party (E) and the 
potential indigenous party (P) are rational players with perfect information about the rules 
of the game, the set of possible payoffs for each player, and how these outcomes are 
preference-ranked by E and P. In order for E to plausibly issue an assimilationist 
challenge, I define E as either a having either a decisive or dictator role in the policy-
making process. Strøm (1995, 62) defines decisive actors as parties that “have the votes 
or authority to produce legislative action, but they cannot necessarily prevent other 
groups from effecting action they do not like” and dictators as actors whose “consent is 
both necessary and sufficient for a legislative decision.” Depending on how the game is 
played, a third player—a horizontal accountability institution (H)—is introduced as an 
exogenous decision-maker. While the consequences of H on the outcome are unknown 
until the players involve the grievance resolution mechanism, the effect of reserved seats 
is known a priori. Specifically, reserved seats, as previously described, minimize the 
electoral system cost factor but do not address the costs to autonomy associated with 
                                                 
4
 Mathematical proofs are provided in the appendix. 
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assimilation into institutional politics and the loss of group rights. In this game, therefore, 
P experiences a cost of entry equal to assimilation costs. Figure 1 presents the extensive 
form of the game, with five sequential decision points (indicated by a column of 
vertically aligned decision nodes) which progress from left to right. The payoffs to each 
player are given immediately to the right of each terminal arrow. 
The game begins with E deciding whether to issue an assimilationist challenge (c) 
or not (~c). In the latter event the game ends at outcome I, representing the status quo, 
and neither player wins a benefit or pays a cost. If an assimilation policy is introduced 
then the indigenous group is forced to respond. P has three options: to acquiesce (a) to 
E’s challenge by giving up autonomy and assimilating, to fight against the challenge by 
entering party competition (f), or to reject the challenge (r). As depicted in Figure 1, if P 
chooses any strategy besides rejection the game ends at either outcome II or III. The path 
to outcomes IV through VIII are realized when P rejects E’s challenge, referring the 
contested matter to H for adjudication. The game branches depending on whether H’s 
ruling is in favor of the established main party (e) or the indigenous group (p). In the 
former case, P has the final decision to acquiesce to the ruling (outcome IV) or dispute 
the ruling and enter into party competition to restore group rights (outcome V). In the 
latter event, it is E who decides to accept H’s decision and give up the challenge 
(outcome VIII), or to reject accountability and force P to either finally give in (outcome 
VII) or fight by forming a party (outcome VI). 
Before attempting to solve for the equilibrium outcome of the game, it is 
necessary to define assumptions about party types and player interests. There are two 
types of parties in the game, strong (s) and weak (w), differentiated by current policy-
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making influence and prospective vote share. For example, a party with dictatorial 
privilege and a substantial advantage in voter support over the second largest party by 
vote share is clearly a strong type. On the other hand, a party with a waning decisiveness 
in policy-making and is enmeshed in highly competitive elections is a prototypical weak 
type of established party. Any newly formed indigenous party is necessarily a weak type 
due to its minority support base and lack of party institutionalization. I therefore begin 
with the assumption that E is a strong party and P, should it decide to form a party, would 
be weak. Further, both E and P possess sufficient information about each other’s strength 
to accurately classify their opponent as strong or weak.
5
 Party type is an important 
distinction in the model of strategic party entry because it factors prominently into the 
credibility of demands and ordering of preferences.
6
 Insofar as E maintains its position as 
a strong type its challenges to P are credible because E, by virtue of its type, has the 
capacity to pay the costs of the challenge (c).
7
 
In the game of indigenous party formation, the challenge is of a specific and 
constant substance; that is, the challenge to the rights and ultimately autonomy of the 
indigenous peoples is issued by E in order to gain the benefits of assimilation to regime 
legitimacy, stability, or access to valuable natural resources. The costs of issuing a 
                                                 
5
 Information about potential indigenous party strength may be obtained through several sources, including: 
census data, other demographic surveys, and registration requirements for indigenous peoples to access 
certain rights or services—especially special district voter rolls which require identification as indigenous 
in order to vote on candidates or party lists in reserved seat elections. Further, the indigenous party entry 
cost and probability of electoral success differentials between reserved seats and general tier seats 
substantially limits the expected legislative strength of new indigenous parties. 
6
 Although Hug (2001) operationalizes party strength as a nominal variable, it is more accurate to think of 
party strength as a continuum ranging from the strongest party in the system to the weakest. However, 
because the parties in the model are only abstractions and therefore cannot be measured for their actual 
level of strength, I generally proceed with the discussion at the nominal level. 
7
 In other words, a credible challenge is one in which the player making the challenge is able to float the 
costs of making the challenge until a net-beneficial payoff can be achieved. 
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challenge include expenditures on advertising, polling, signature collection, and other 
strategies to persuade and demonstrate supportive public opinion (Hug 2001). In addition 
to these general components, I add two costs particular to the assimilationist challenge: 
legal fees—which are included in the calculation of c—and the investment of party 
reputation on the issue. Because this investment can show a positive return if the 
indigenous group assimilates or a negative return if the challenge is ultimately 
unsuccessful, I define it separately as a and it is only realized on the cost side of E’s 
payoff if E acquiesces to a rejection of the challenge. If the challenge is successful, the 
return on investment is included on the benefit side of E’s payoff as either bw when the 
indigenous group assimilates by forming a party or bc when the group concedes to the 
challenge without entering party competition. In the former case, E faces costs associated 
with fighting the new party in elections (f) which is less or more expensive depending on 
the new party’s strength.
8
 E’s ordered preferences for these benefits and costs are given 
by the following assumptions, respectively
9
: 
For the potential new indigenous party, being coerced into this game by the 
actions of an established main party, there are only potential costs as payoffs. These costs 
are of three varieties: accepting the challenge and conceding group rights and autonomy 
(a), rejecting the challenge by referring it to a grievance resolution mechanism (r), or 
fighting against the challenge—and E—by forming a party and contesting the next 
                                                 
8
 Fighting may occur against a weak type party (fw) or a strong type party (fs), though E will only fight 
against fw whereas P may end up fighting either fw or fs. 
9
 Payoffs are normalized to equal zero for a costless demand. 
 0 < 𝑏𝑤 < 𝑏𝑐 (1) 
 0 < 𝑓𝑤 < 𝑓𝑠 < 𝑎 (2) 
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general election (f). Although both forming a party and accepting the challenge require 
exchanging autonomy for assimilation, the decision to fight E in elections is preferable 
because it holds onto the potential for restoring the status quo ex ante through influencing 
policy as a party in the legislature. The least costly strategy is represented by r since 
referring the assimilation policy to H does not require giving up any autonomy, whether 
temporary as in f or permanent as in a. Moreover, if H rules unfavorably, or if the H’s 
decision is favorable to P but E refuses accountability, in choosing r P retains the ability 
to fight. 
 
Hence, these costs are related as shown in the following assumption: 
However, because of the potential involvement of H, it is possible for P’s cost 
incentives to be reordered. Horizontal accountability failures (occurring in the game at 
P’s two rightmost decision-points) function as an exogenous shock on the institutional 
environment which raises the salience of indigenous identity and facilitates new party 
entry (Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994; Tavits 2006). In this altered environment, P faces a 
renewed challenge from E with the following restructured cost relationship: 
 0 < (𝑟 − 𝑟) < 𝑓𝑠 < 𝑎 (4) 
The negation of P’s ability to reject and refer demands to H reflects the indigenous 
group’s loss of its institutional safeguard against violations of its rights and autonomy. 
Hence, P is left with the option to acquiesce to the assimilationist demand of E or to form 
a party. The latter continues to be the preferred strategy for the indigenous group because, 
while costing a similar level of assimilation, only entering party competition can offer the 
indigenous group an immediate restoration of minimal autonomy through representation 
by an independent indigenous party in addition to the long-run possibility of restoring the 
 0 < 𝑟 < 𝑓𝑠 < 𝑎 (3) 
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capacity of the horizontal accountability institution to protect group rights. In other words, 
forming a party provides an indigenous group with the opportunity to exercise the 
horizontal accountability function of the legislature against an indigenous rights-
transgressing governing party until the standing grievance resolution mechanism can be 
rehabilitated and secured against future failures. In this sense, the assimilation cost 
represented by fs is at least potentially temporary whereas the same cost associated with 
choosing a is comparatively permanent. 
The final relevant actor is the horizontal accountability institution. Although H’s 
decision-making is assumed to be exogenous and random for the purposes of the game, it 
still has an important effect on the outcome. This effect is transmitted through H’s 
potential to legitimize or delegitimize assimilation policy and, subsequently, the actors 
who support or oppose that policy. Courts have the ability to influence public perceptions 
of policy and actor legitimacy by their power to endorse or invalidate policy (Clawson et 
al. 2001; Mondak 1992, 1994; Vanberg 2015). Hence, H confers a legitimacy (l) penalty 
and reward to the loser and winner of its decision, respectively. External validation of the 
challenge provides E with a benefit to its position while an adverse decision by H costs E 
issue legitimacy. The opposite effects apply to P and can boost or undermine the 
indigenous group’s pursuit of autonomy. As with c, l is independent of any other benefits 
and costs in the game, and cannot be ordered. However, these factors do influence the 
order of preferred outcomes for each player as shown in Table 1. 
In the baseline model, I assume H to be neutral such that there is an equal chance 
of H deciding in favor of E or P (given by α = .5, where α is the probability of H 
choosing p). I also assume, for the time being, that E is strong enough that rejections of 
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its challenge by neither P nor H will lead E to withdraw its challenge. Under these 
conditions, the only plausible equilibrium outcomes are III, V, and VI. Outcomes II, IV, 
and VII do not occur because the indigenous group always prefers the cost mitigation 
strategy of fighting over acquiescing to assimilation demands (−𝑓 > −𝑎). Additionally, 
outcomes I and VIII are not reached by definition of E as a strong type, implying that the 
challenge is credible and the benefits are greater than the costs. This leaves outcomes III, 
V, and VI with positive payouts to E and the least costly available alternatives for P. In 
each instance, the general effect is the same: the indigenous group forms a party and 
enters into electoral competition against E in order to restore its rights while the 
established main party wins the assimilation benefits of regime legitimacy and stability 
by way of P’s participation.
10
 In the following special models, I relax some of the 
assumptions of the baseline model—namely, the perceived disposition of H towards 
assimilationist challenges and the strength of E. The equilibrium outcomes of these 
special models are presented graphically in Figure 2. 
 
Special Model 1: Unfavorable Horizontal Accountability Outcome 
Adjusting the assumption about H’s reputation with P so that P regards H as more likely 
to make an unfavorable decision by affirming E’s assimilationist challenge produces very 
similar equilibrium results as the baseline model. In the unfavorability condition (α < .5), 
outcomes V and VI are eliminated from the set of plausible results because the potential 
legitimacy effect from a favorable ruling by H is less likely to occur than an issue 
                                                 
10
 Which particular outcome from the general baseline equilibrium set of III, V, and VI depends on P’s 
level of risk-aversion. As P’s risk-acceptance increases, it is more likely that P will reject E’s initial 
challenge and progress the game to H, resulting in either outcome V or VI. As P’s risk-aversion increases, 
outcome III becomes more likely. 
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legitimacy punishment resulting from H ruling against P. Further, from E’s perspective 
this condition is considered favorable (~α > .5) and the expected value of any outcome 
besides outcomes I and VIII is preferable. Because E controls whether outcome VIII 
occurs, and thus can avoid it by choosing to continue the challenge, E chooses to initiate 
a challenge at the beginning of the game. Hence, the equilibrium outcome when 
horizontal accountability institutions are perceived as unfavorable by indigenous groups 
facing an assimilationist challenge is immediate indigenous party formation (outcome III). 
 
Special Model 2: Favorable Horizontal Accountability Outcome 
On the other hand, if H is instead considered by P to have a favorable reputation and 
therefore is thought to be more likely to deny the legitimacy of E’s challenge (α > .5), 
then outcome III is instead removed from the baseline set of plausible outcomes. This is 
because the favorability condition produces an expected payoff wherein fighting later is 
valued over fighting now. Thus, when horizontal accountability favors the indigenous 
group’s autonomy, and maintaining the assumption of E as a strong party such that the 
challenge is credible, the result is indigenous party formation (outcome VI). In the event 
that H supports E’s assimilation demand, a new indigenous party again is formed, 
although in this instance the party enters with a relative issue legitimacy disadvantage 
(outcome V). 
These outcomes are possible only if E does not alter its strategy in response to a 
change in H’s disposition regarding the indigenous assimilation-autonomy issue. In 
contrast to P’s change in optimal strategy when H moves from unfavorable to favorable, 
E continues to prefer initiating a challenge rather than not at the first decision point 
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owing to the nature of E as a strong type making credible challenges. For E, then, even 
when ~α < .5 the expectation of a positive utility from continuing the assimilationist 
challenge persists. This leads to P always taking the last turn, and given that P will 
always prefer to fight over accept assimilation, a game with a favorable H will end in 
indigenous party entry at outcomes V and VI. 
 
Special Model 3: Varying Established Party Strength 
Until now, each equilibrium outcome has resulted in indigenous party formation. 
However, this changes if E’s strength is allowed to vary. When E is a relatively stronger 
party it is more likely to expect a profitable outcome from initiating a challenge and it 
will feel more secure in rejecting horizontal accountability following H’s ruling. On the 
other hand, relaxing the assumption of established main party strength makes it possible 
for the game to end without indigenous party formation (outcomes I and VIII). As E’s 
strength decreases (such as moving from the position of majority government to surplus 
coalition partner, or becoming increasingly vulnerable to electoral defeat as the 
competitiveness of elections rises) so does the cost of refusing horizontal accountability, 
and therefore the option of accepting H’s ruling in favor of P increases in attractiveness 
(outcome VIII). The logic of this outcome is revealed through a brief examination of 
comparative statics. When E weakens the relative size of the legitimacy punishment l 
increases, as does the marginal cost of maintaining the challenge c. This is explained by a 
weak party having fewer resources and greater electoral vulnerability compared to a 
strong party. As Figure 1 shows, each continuation of the challenge increases costs to E, 




 A weak E therefore rationally accepts H’s accountability and withdraws its 
challenge to P (outcome VIII) rather than pursue the more costly strategy of pressing 
forward with the challenge (outcomes VI and VII). 
There are two additional ways in which an indigenous party can fail to form with 
respect to variation in E’s strength. First, if H is perceived as unfavorable to E, and 
controlling for E’s level of risk-aversion, E may not even put forth an assimilationist 
challenge in the first place (outcome I). In this case, E has determined that pushing an 
assimilation policy on P is likely to put E in a worse position than it enjoys in the status 
quo. Second, E may start out as a strong type making a credible challenge, but in the 
interregnum between E’s initial move and the publication of H’s decision something 
happens to make E weak (such as an election or a series of defections). In such an event, 
E may take a cost cutting approach and acquiesce to H rather than refuse accountability, 
leading to outcome VIII and no indigenous party formation. 
Altogether, the baseline and special models imply three hypotheses related to 
ethnic party formation by ethnic minority groups who prefer autonomy and protection of 
their rights: 
H1: If the demand for assimilation can be referred to a functioning institution of 
horizontal accountability, no indigenous party will form until after 
adjudication. 
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 The compounding of the legitimacy penalty from an unfavorable decision by H does not affect E and P in 
the same way. As noted, E’s strategy of creating a failure of horizontal accountability by continuing its 
assimilationist challenge leads to a multiplication of E’s legitimacy cost (outcomes VI and VII). However, 
when P is on the losing end of H’s ruling and decides to fight the challenge by forming a party (outcome V), 
there is no such compounding effect. The reason for this difference is that P is working through existing 
institutions to achieve its interests whereas E is subverting them. Of course, this explanation assumes that H 
is perceived as legitimate by voters and that these voters will hold E accountable for its transgression. 
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H2: If the grievance is decided against the interests of the indigenous group, an 
indigenous party will form. 
 
H3: If the grievance is decided in favor of the indigenous group, an indigenous 
party will form if the established party chooses to refuse the ruling but not if 
the ruling is respected. 
 
 
New Indigenous Party Success 
Turning to the electoral success of newly formed indigenous parties, I first expect that 
variation in new party success is influenced by the interaction of electoral institutions and 
the geographic distribution of the indigenous group. As described near the beginning of 
section two, proportional representation (PR) systems with low electoral thresholds—
marked by high district magnitude and reserved seats—in addition to permissive and non-
spatially conditioned registration requirements should be associated with higher vote and 
seat shares if the indigenous group is geographically evenly distributed. Where 
indigenous groups are geographically concentrated, on the other hand, majoritarian 
electoral systems—especially systems with single member districts (SMDs)—are 
conducive to indigenous parties winning a higher portion of votes and seats. These 
relationships assume a tendency towards homogeneity in indigenous group voting 
behavior in the direction of supporting an indigenous party above its competitors. For 
now, I will contend that this assumption is validated by the events leading up to 
indigenous party formation: the politicization of indigenous identity by mainstream 
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Further, the opposition response to the strategic failure of horizontal 
accountability mechanisms and subsequent entry of an indigenous party—in addition to 
the legitimacy penalties and rewards received by E and P—may have an effect on the 
electoral success of the new indigenous party. Meguid (2005) contributes a modified 
spatial model of niche party success which posits that the interaction of main party 
responses to a new niche party—of which new indigenous parties emerging under my 
model are a type—can influence the salience and ownership of the niche party’s issue, 
thereby affecting its level of support in the general electorate. The three types of main 
party response identified by Meguid are accommodative, adversarial, and dismissive. 
Although Meguid’s theory of main party response has been tested and found to be a 
statistically insignificant variable in explaining ethnic party success (Bernauer & 
Bochsler 2011), I argue that this result is attributable to Bernauer and Bochsler’s research 
design which does not account for interactions between established elites and ethnic 
minority groups prior to ethnic party formation. My model allows me to improve upon 
this previous test of Meguid’s theory by informing the arrangement of starting 
relationships. I assume that the established party which manufactured a failure of 
horizontal accountability signals an adversarial stance relative to the new indigenous 
party, given that its policy actions directly conflict with indigenous group interests. 
The effect on electoral support for the indigenous party is therefore impacted by 
the strategic response of the main opposition party. If the opposition party is either 
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 In the next part, I discuss the implications of heterogeneity of indigenous peoples. 
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dismissive of the indigenous party or joins the governing party in its adversarial 
orientation, the new indigenous party should receive greater electoral support. In the 
former instance, the adversarial behavior has a stronger effect on voter perception of 
issue legitimacy (indigenous group rights) ownership (the new indigenous party) than the 
‘no-comment’ style of the dismissive strategy. In the latter case, the indigenous party 
should also benefit from more votes because the main parties are acting in concert to 
legitimize the issue of indigenous group rights. However, if the opposition party adopts 
an accommodative response, indigenous party vote shares improve when the adversarial 
strategy is stronger than the competing accommodation. If the accommodative strategy 
were to be stronger, it would legitimize the issue of indigenous group rights, but also 
claim ownership of the issue through its more strongly established reputation and 
capacity for reaching a broad audience with its own messaging on the issue. The 
adversarial strategy militates against the effectiveness of accommodation because it 
predates the opposition party’s campaign, securing issue ownership for the indigenous 
party. The effects of main party interactions are compounded or mitigated by the 
distribution of legitimacy payoffs assigned during the indigenous party formation process. 
Consequently, I test three additional hypotheses, this time relating to new 
indigenous party success: 
H4: Electoral success should be greater where the geographic distribution of the 
indigenous group comports with the proportionality of the electoral system. 
 
H5: If the main opposition party takes on an adversarial or dismissive stance 
towards the indigenous party, the new indigenous party should receive 
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greater voter support. 
H6: If the main opposition party carries an accommodative strategy which is 
more persuasive of voter perceptions than the competing adversarial 
strategy, the indigenous party’s vote shares should decrease. 
 
 
A Note on the Consequences of Indigenous Group Cohesion 
Up to this point, my model has assumed homogeneity of indigenous peoples’ interests 
and behavior. While the assimilationist challenge of mainstream parties may work to 
activate an encompassing indigenous identity as a reflection of the common experience of 
colonial and postcolonial subordinations, it is also possible that this high level of 
indigenous groupness is impeded by salient cleavages within the indigenous population. 
Heterogeneity of indigenous peoples can lead to specific indigenous groups, such as 
those constructed around tribal associations, holding differently ordered preferences 
between them and therefore different optimal strategies. Lower levels of cohesion among 
indigenous peoples as a whole may work against indigenous party formation since each 
particular group must bear the costs of fighting an assimilationist challenge. 
Consequently, it is possible that in some instances the costs of rejecting a challenge and 
forming a party to contest elections outweigh the cost of accepting E’s assimilationist 
challenge, leading to no indigenous party entry at outcomes II, IV, and VII. 
Alternatively, multiple indigenous parties may form and enter into electoral 
competition. In this case, I expect that Raymond’s (2015) observation that the number of 
indigenous parties is effectively limited by the availability of finite resources and 
constituents will prove insightful. The implication is that when multiple indigenous 
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parties form, they will be competing against each other as well as against mainstream 
parties, reducing their probability of electoral success. However, it is also possible that 
the design of the electoral system in terms of the geography and magnitude of districts 
may reduce the effect of inter-indigenous group competition if these institutional features 
align with the ethnic cleavages around which indigenous groups collect. For example if 
an indigenous population is mobilized into two different groups, a nationwide low 
magnitude district is likely to split the vote and lower the success of both indigenous 
parties. On the other hand, if these groups are concentrated in geographically distinct 
areas and there are multiple electoral districts drawn in coincidence with this geography, 
then inter-indigenous competition is more likely to be low and electoral success for each 
indigenous party is likely to be higher. These expectations highlight the importance of the 
term “group” in H4 and its interpretation as a flexible, constructed concept. 
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IV. Case Studies 
 
 
To test these hypotheses, I employ a diverse case study method. As Seawright and 
Gerring (2008) explain, maximizing the variance of the independent variables of interest 
in the selection of cases improves the representativeness of the sample and thus 
mitigating—though not completely eliminating—a prominent drawback of small-N 
approaches. Starting from the lists of ethnic seat reservations complied by Htun (2004) 
and Bird (2014), I narrowed the initial set of approximately 25 cases by eliminating non-
democracies and countries lacking a reserved seat system for indigenous groups from the 
sampling frame. These eliminations were made to ensure that the cases studied each 
involved parties and potential new parties who could make meaningful decisions about 
their political participation, and so that the potential new parties considered had similar 
historical orientations towards the state and modern political institutions. Controlling for 
regime type and indigenous group preferences for autonomy, I then selected three 
cases—New Zealand, Colombia, and Taiwan—which exhibited a diversity of values 
along the independent variables of reserved seat system, horizontal accountability failure, 
geographic dispersion of the indigenous group population, and main opposition party 
positioning on the issue of indigenous group autonomy. The remainder of this section 
describes the institutional, historical, and demographic context, the strategic decisions 
made by each actor, and the electoral fate of newly formed indigenous parties. Each case 
concludes with a discussion of whether the evidence supports or disconfirms individual 
hypotheses. The results are summarized in Table 2. 
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New Zealand 
Maori comprise 15.2 percent of New Zealand’s population and are distributed between 
urban and rural areas throughout the country (Kroeber 2017). Although a common 
language may contribute to a countrywide Maori identity, extended family (whanau), 
clans (hapu), tribal institutions composed of multiple hapu (iwi), and urban Maori 
associations are more prevalent in day-to-day life (Murphy 2008). Nonetheless, according 
to White (2016, 179), the processes of colonization and urbanization have transformed 
the Maori worldview from one based on a relationship with land to a “pan-tribal 
connection that is based to a greater extent on social affiliations.” White explains that this 
connection is underpinned by Maori cultural concepts of community and 
intergenerational transmission of knowledge. Thus, despite the influence of an 
industrialized capitalist economy on sociocultural transformations among Maori, there 
remains a national level groupness based on a shared history of colonial subordination 
along with the resilience of a common language and genealogical tradition. 
In this context, contemporary Maori political orientation towards the state is 
generally characterized by a demand for self-determination (tino rangatiratanga) and 
engagement through direct action. Maori advocate for policies which conform to 
principles of collective responsibility and Maori autonomy, such as the devolution of 
welfare administration to Maori organizations (Humpage 2017). Further, some Maori 
issue “sharp criticisms of the parliamentary route to Maori empowerment,” going so far 
as to seek “abolition of the Maori seats and for greater Maori activism and political 
organization outside the parliamentary forum” (Murphy 2008, 197, original emphasis). 
For instance, Bargh (2013) highlights grassroots (usually environmentally oriented) 
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actions are common among Maori as a way to advocate specific issues without 
committing support to a broad party platform. 
Maori preferences for autonomy and extra-institutional forms of participation 
contributed to the non-development of a viable Maori party for nearly the first 140 years 
of the existence of reserved seats. The founding document of New Zealand, the Treaty of 
Waitangi signed in 1840 between Britain and Maori, established several articles 
enumerating the rights of Maori and forms the basis of modern Maori claims to self-
determination. This aspect of the treaty provided legal justification for the creation of 
separate Maori electorates (Bargh 2013). Specifically, the Maori Representation Act 1867 
temporarily created four seats in the New Zealand parliament to be elected by male Maori. 
Following an extension of the reserved seats for an additional five-year period, the seats 
were made permanent in 1876 after being determined highly useful to the European 
settlers: for one, many Maori could not vote in general elections because they did not 
hold private property as was required to be enfranchised; for two, even if Maori had 
gained property and thus voting rights, there would be no effect on nonindigenous MPs 
because of an 1893 law which banned Maori from participating in general tier elections at 
all (Geddis 2014). Only in 1975 were Maori voters allowed the choice of which 
electorate—the general or reserved Maori—to enroll.
13
 In addition to ensuring European 
settlers’ political dominance, Maori reserved seats were thought to facilitate “cooperation 
with European laws and institutions, allowing the Maori population to be assimilated 
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 Until 1975, Maori identity, and consequently voter eligibility, was determined by blood quantum laws. 
As Geddis (2014, 241) explains: “For the next 82 years [from the adoption of the 1893 exclusion of Maori 
from general elections], ending only in 1975, an individual's participation in the electoral process was 
determined by genealogy: persons with greater than 50% ‘Maori blood’ had to vote in a Maori electorate; 
persons with less than 50% "Maori blood" had to vote in a European electorate; while only ‘half-castes’ 
could choose between the two.” 
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more rapidly so that state consolidation, settlement, and economic expansion could 
proceed apace” (Murphy 2008, 192). 
While the European settlers’ motivation for implementing a reserved seat system 
was to bring Maori into the Europeanized New Zealand state through controlled 
participation in its political institutions, Maori came to associate voting with assimilation 
and the forfeiture of autonomy (Banducci et al. 2004; Bargh 2013). Amid declining 
turnout due to rising disproportionality in the conversion of vote shares to seats under 
New Zealand’s majoritarian electoral system, a trend beginning in 1938 and peaking in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, Maori voters were even less likely than European-
descendant New Zealanders to vote in either the general or reserved electorates (Karp & 
Banducci 1999). In response, electoral reform was passed through a 1993 referendum and 
implemented for the 1996 parliamentary elections. The new multimember proportional 
system was associated with increasing voter turnout, including reducing to statistical 
insignificance the difference in turnout rates between nonindigenous and Maori voters 
(Karp & Banducci 1999). 
This latter change was encouraged by the provision of population-adjusted 
reserved seats as a component of electoral reform. From the establishment of reserved 
seats in 1867 to the Electoral Act of 1993, the number of Maori reserved seats was held 
constant at four, all the while the general tier of the New Zealand legislature steadily 
expanded, effectively decreasing Maori representation (Banducci et al. 2004). The reform 
made the number of reserved seats dependent on the number of Maori registered on the 
Maori electoral roll, leading to incremental increases in the number of reserved seats 
from four to seven as of 2001 (Geddis 2014). The seats are elected via SMDs which 
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together cover the entire territory of New Zealand. Candidates for these seats may be 
either Maori or non-Maori, but only those Maori voters who register for the reserved 
Maori roll are eligible to vote in reserved seat elections. 
Although these reforms increased Maori voter participation and minimized the 
electoral system component of the cost of party entry, a specifically Maori party was yet 
unformed.
14
 Instead, the two major parties, Labour and National, competed for the 
reserved seats. Until the early 2000s, Maori were shielded from assimilation demands by 
the Waitangi Tribunal, a horizontal accountability institution established in 1975 to “hear 
claims of breached treaty rights…and may make proposals for long term restoration” 
(Lashley 2000, 7-8). Although the Tribunal’s decisions were not legally binding, its 
recommendations grew in informal authority, and prompted Maori to make greater use of 
national courts (Belgrave 2014). The Treaty of Waitangi’s guarantee of tino 
rangatiratanga forms the basis on which Maori found their claims for self-determination 
and restoration in the Tribunal (O’Sullivan 2008). These settlements are critical to Maori 
economic and social standing. 
As a result of the importance of the Waitangi Tribunal and courts to Maori 
interests, the Labour Party’s decision to override the Maori Land Court and then the 
Court of Appeal’s 2003 ruling in favor of Maori land ownership rights prompted the 
mobilization of Maori voters as a cohesive indigenous group and the formation of the 
Maori Party (Belgrave 2014). The Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004 promulgated by the 
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 In fact, two nominally ethnic parties formed during the 20
th
 century in New Zealand: the Rātana Party 
from the 1930s and later the Mana Motuhake Party in 1979. However, the Rātana Party was soon absorbed 
into the Labour Party and Mana Motuhake failed to achieve any political significance (Belgrave 2014). 
Moreover, Labour won most Maori reserved seat elections from 1943 to 1993 (Karp & Banducci 1999). I 
argue, therefore, that these parties should not be counted as ethnic parties because they made rather 
peripheral appeals to Maori identity and interests instead of acting as “a party that is the champion of the 
particular interests of one ethnic category or set of categories” (Chandra 2011, 155). 
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Labour government intended to nationalize lands claimed by the Maori and was a direct 
subversion of the Court of Appeal’s 2003 decision. As O’Sullivan (2008, 327-328) notes, 
the legislation “removed the right to ask a Court to determine whether or not a property 
right exists, which clearly limits access to due legal process” and “diminished the extent 
to which Maori may exercise self-determination.” This maneuver was not only 
unprecedented but also threatened the tradition of discovering aboriginal rights through 
the courts and the Maori strategy of using “the courts to try to assert Treaty or common-
law rights” (Belgrave 2014, 208). This rejection of horizontal accountability led Labour 
MP Tariana Turia to defect from the party and form the Maori Party. 
The opposition National Party’s 2008 parliamentary election campaign took an 
adversarial stance towards the Maori Party, arguing that Maori reserved seats should be 
abolished (Tahana 2008). While Labour lost its majority and National gained enough 
seats to form a government, the Maori Party won five seats and was able to negotiate a 
supply and confidence agreement with National, giving the Maori Party influence over 
policy-making. The Maori Party’s electoral success enabled it to achieve key policy gains 
including replacing the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004, staving off National’s plan to 
eliminate Maori reserved seats, and the signing of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Humpage 2017). With the restoration of important aspects of group 
rights and autonomy, the assimilation cost was no longer worth paying for many Maori 
voters, often claiming that the Maori Party had “sold out to National’s neoliberal 
economic agenda” by the 2014 elections (Humpage 2017, 477). This sentiment was 
reflected in the results for the Maori Party, which only won a single seat in the 2014 
parliament. 
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In summary, Maori have a strong demand for autonomy which, when threatened, 
motivates their mobilization as a cohesive group. For over a century, however, the 
combination of the colonial legacy attaching itself to reserved seats and voting, the 
restrictive voter eligibility requirements applied to Maori, and the respect of governments 
for the authority of the Waitangi Tribunal and other institutions of horizontal 
accountability, meant that no indigenous party formed. Even after the liberalization of 
Maori voting rules and electoral reform to a PR system, no new indigenous party 
contested elections. For as long as courts were able to rule on assimilationist challenges, 
Maori did not act to form an indigenous party, suggesting that H1 has merit. Once Labour 
refused horizontal accountability by adopting the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act—a 
move which subverted the authority of courts to rule on indigenous autonomy and 
pressed an assimilation policy on indigenous lands in order to gain an economic 
benefit—the Maori Party was formed and entered into electoral competition. This series 
of events provides evidence in support of H3 which postulates that a grievance decided in 
favor of the indigenous group will result in indigenous party formation if the established 
mainstream party rejects the ruling. 
In terms of indigenous party success, the case of the Maori Party in New Zealand 
lends support to all three hypotheses. The dispersion of Maori across electoral districts in 
combination with a PR electoral system, along with the restriction of the reserved seat 
electorate to registered Maori voters, facilitated the ability of the Maori Party to win 
multiple legislative seats, supporting H4. As for H5, the expectation that a new 
indigenous party will experience greater success if the main opposition party takes an 
adversarial stance is supported by the evidence in this case. The legitimacy reward gained 
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by the Maori Party from the court’s favorable ruling provided issue credibility to the 
Maori Party, and the National Party’s adversarial stance boosted the Maori Party’s 
position. However, in the ensuing round of parliamentary elections accommodative 
stances between the main parties and the Maori Party was associated with a loss of votes 
and ultimately seats, giving evidence in favor of H6. 
 
Colombia 
Approximately 2 percent of Colombia’s population is indigenous, with over 80 percent of 
indigenous peoples living on resguardos (collective lands owned by indigenous groups 
granted to them during the colonial period) that cover about one quarter of Colombia’s 
land area (Van Cott 2000). The indigenous population of Colombia is diverse with 81 
different indigenous ethnicities (Troyan 2008). Altogether 800,000 indigenous peoples 
are now living in Colombia; a number, however, which represents a dramatic decrease 
from the approximately ten million indigenous inhabitants at the time of the Spanish 
Conquest (Hristov 2005). Indigenous land is host to Colombia’s most economically 
valuable resources and has been targeted by Spanish colonizers and missionaries, to more 
recently wealthy ranchers, extractive industry enterprises, drug traffickers, and the state 
(Hristov 2005). 
Indeed, indigenous peoples and territory has been the subject of exploitation and 
violence from the moment of colonization through to the 21
st
 century. During the colonial 
period, the Spanish Crown created resguardos not as a benevolent guard against 
displacement by Spanish colonists but in order to maintain indigenous peoples as a 
source of labor, although after independence resguardos “were expropriated and 
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transformed into large rural estates privately owned by the white elite” (Hristov 2005, 93). 
The independent Colombian state carried out land reforms at the direction of the two 
parties which ruled together under the National Front pact. Liberal and conservative elites 
negotiated this power-sharing pact to restore stability and secure their own political 
influence following a period of violence from 1947-1953 (Troyan 2008). Over the course 
of the National Front era, which lasted 16 years from 1957 to 1973, indigenous identity 
and history was subject to erasure by the National Front as a part of its liberal project of 
constructing an abstract national identity and separation from the colonial past in order to 
consolidate regime legitimacy (Findji 2018). The material component of this assimilation 
policy includes supporting private non-indigenous settlements on resguardo plots, 
leading to reductions in the jurisdiction of Law 89 of 1890—a law which otherwise 
provides the legal justification for cabildo (indigenous council which administers 
resguardos) authority and indigenous collective ownership of these lands (Findji 2018). 
Several indigenous movements eventually emerged out of the response to the 
assimilation policies implemented under the National Front. Initially, though, the 
grassroots answer to the National Front’s land reform was led by youth, leftist, and 
guerrilla groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC 
(Findji 2018). The state countered by politicizing ethnic identity in an attempt to 
disempower the threat of class-based movements, and with the FARC being too dogmatic 
for the preferences of indigenous groups, a specifically indigenous-led activism 
developed (Troyan 2008). Hence, from the early 1970s, and despite indigenous ethnic 
heterogeneity, collective mobilization led by indigenous groups in the Cauca region 
worked to restore the autonomy of cabildos (Troyan 2008). Hristov provides the example 
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of the Indigenous Council of the Cauca Region (Consejo Regional Indigena del Caucay, 
CRIC), formed in 1971 by indigenous delegates from multiple regions with the goal of 
achieving indigenous autonomy: 
In their [CRIC’s] own words, ‘land means a union, from the land comes 
our language, our customs; in it we work, from it we derive our education, 
with it we clarify our ideas’ (CINEP 1978, 113). Accordingly, land is seen 
as the basis of indigenous cultural and social institutions, way of life, 
identity, and therefore the object of struggle…Given the centrality of land 
to its membership and programme, the main form of collective action 
undertaken by the CRIC has been land invasions/occupations…At the start 
of the 1980s, the CRIC participated in 32 such land recovery actions. The 
taking over of haciendas that were inside a resguardo allowed the 
resguardo to be extended, while the invasion of haciendas outside a 
resguardo allowed for new resguardos and cabildos to be established. 
(Hristov 2005, 97-98) 
Van Cott (2003) further identifies a number of indigenous organizations which developed 
in response to the assimilationist challenge of the government between the 1970s and 
1980s, including the Colombian Indigenous Authorities Movement (Movimiento de 
Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia, AICO) formed in 1977, and the Colombian National 
Indigenous Organization (Organización Nacional Indigena de Colombia, ONIC) founded 
in 1982. The latter formed as an umbrella organization for various indigenous group 
movements with the purpose of achieving legal recognition for indigenous territorial 
claims as well as for indigenous self-governance in terms of the administration of justice, 
education, and health care (Hristov 2005). 
Importantly, rather than seek to influence assimilation policy by forming into 
indigenous parties, these organizations were—at least until 1990—engaged in social 
movement employing extra-institutional strategies in their effort to secure indigenous 
autonomy. The assimilationist challenge posed by the National Front pact’s appropriation 
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of indigenous land for wealthy elites and erasure of indigenous identity was severe 
enough to motivate collective action by diverse indigenous groups. However, the lack of 
reserved seats and the effective exclusion of any party from office besides those of the 
National Front pact rendered the electoral costs too high for indigenous party formation 
to be a rational strategy. 
Yet without an effective institutional link between the cabildos and the national 
court system which reinforces rather than dismisses indigenous rights, what gains were 
made by the land reclamation movement and other strategies that eschewed participation 
in party politics were ultimately unstable (Van Cott 2000). On the other hand, the ethnic 
tensions produced by land reform grievances and the indigenous group’s abstention from 
institutional forms of political participation threatened the legitimacy and stability of the 
state. In 1990, mainstream elites attempted to increase state legitimacy by holding 
Constituent Assembly elections and rewriting the constitution with the aim of “making 
the legal and political systems more inclusive and participatory” (Van Cott 2000, 211). 
The system used for electing the Constituent Assembly was a highly proportional single 
nationwide district, significantly reducing the effective electoral threshold. Now, with 
both low electoral system costs and facing high assimilation costs without an effective 
institution of horizontal accountability to protect indigenous rights from government 
violation, several indigenous parties entered the contest for Constituent Assembly seats. 
ONIC and AICO formed parties and won one seat each in the Assembly (Findji 2018; 
Van Cott 2003). And while the major parties (the Liberals and Conservatives) remained 
hostile to the newly formed indigenous parties, several indigenous candidates also 
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contested and won local level elections on a platform advocating the defense of 
indigenous rights (Findji 2018). 
The 1991 constitution included a number of reforms which altered the 
institutional environment in ways important to indigenous groups and parties. First, 
indigenous representation in the Constituent Assembly allowed for indigenous interests in 
creating effective horizontal accountability mechanisms and securing group autonomy to 
be written into the 1991 constitution. The establishment of a constitutional court and, as 
Van Cott (2000) notes, especially Article 246 of the new constitution requiring 
coordination between the national judicial system and indigenous jurisdictions, improved 
the potential for favorable outcomes in disputes between the state and indigenous people. 
Second, it led to the deinstitutionalization and greater volatility of Colombia’s 
party system, opening up space for entry and potential success of new parties. The 
‘democracy through decentralization’ reforms implemented by the new constitution 
disrupted established clientelist networks and provided public financing and media 
coverage to parties and movements with political representation (Dargent & Muñoz 2011; 
Van Cott 2003). As Ramírez and Cobos (2018) observe, these changes were 
complemented by people’s low levels of institutional trust resulting from previous years’ 
experience with parties catering to the interests of elites instead of integrating the 
demands of social movements into party platforms. 
Finally, the 1991 constitution also reserved one seat in the House and two seats in 
the Senate for which only indigenous voters could cast ballots, as well as permitting 
social movements to nominate candidates without officially registering as a political 
party (Van Cott 2003). The reduction in electoral barriers combined with the weakening 
57 
of established national parties led Colombia’s party system to expand from a bipartisan 
model to a multiparty system in which visible social movements could win representation 
(Ramírez & Cobos 2018). However, these reserved seats were elected from nationwide 
districts and internal ethnic divisions within Colombia’s indigenous population divided 
votes among candidates, leading to the limited success of indigenous parties (Van Cott 
2003). ONIC has since exited party competition, while the Indigenous Authorities 
Movement (associated with AICO) and the Alianza Social Indigena (associated with 
CRIC) winning few seats in Congress and struggling to top one percent of the national 
vote (Kollman et al. 2018). Thus, while multiple indigenous parties formed in the early 
1990s, only ASI persisted into the 21
st
 century. The manner of ASI’s viability, though, 
begs the question of whether it may still be considered an indigenous party, given that it 
has maintained its competitiveness by expanding its constituent base beyond strictly 
indigenous communities to include peasants, urban labor, and demobilized guerrilla 
fighters (Van Cott 2010). 
To conclude, the high level of diversity in Colombia’s indigenous population was 
overcome by indigenous mobilizations in response to the severe assimilation policies of 
the National Front pact. However, prior to the 1991 constitution, there was no reserved 
seat system in place to provide indigenous groups representation in liberal institutional 
politics nor was there any real opportunity for policy influence or gaining office due to 
the power-sharing agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Following 
the prolonged period of horizontal accountability failures of cabildos, Law 89 of 1890, 
and the national courts, the formation of three indigenous parties—ASI (CRIC), ONIC, 
and IAM (AICO)—immediately upon the reduction of electoral barriers in the election of 
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the Constituent Assembly suggests that H2 is supported by the evidence presented here. 
That is, the lack of support for indigenous rights and autonomy from existing horizontal 
accountability institutions against assimilation policies provoked indigenous party entry 
once electoral system costs were lowered. Because of the extended delay between the 
onset of the assimilation policy and the entry of indigenous parties due to electoral 
barriers in this case, I claim only moderate support for H2. 
As for electoral success of the multiple indigenous parties that formed, the 
adversarial stances of the mainstream parties towards indigenous interests provided an 
issue ownership benefit to the new indigenous parties and correlated with their initial 
successes, supporting H5. However, the salience of the need for institutional recognition 
and security of indigenous rights decreased following the 1991 constitutional revision as 
indigenous organizations gained access to political representation and were supported by 
strengthened horizontal accountability in the form of a national court and restored cabildo 
authority. In addition, the nationwide reserved district contributed to splitting the vote 
between multiple indigenous parties, leaving only ASI to survive past the turn of the 
century—and only then by expanding its base of electoral support beyond its indigenous 




The complex intersection of party politics with ethnic and national identity which 
characterizes Taiwan has led to internal fractionalization, strategic cooptation, and 
general apathy of the indigenous peoples of Taiwan. Fetzer and Soper (2011) identify 
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three primary ethnic groups which compose the population of Taiwan: the mainlanders 
who arrived from China in 1949 (about 14 percent of the total population), the native 
Taiwanese who came to the island largely between the 1600s and start of the 1900s 
(about 84 percent),
15
 and the indigenous peoples (about 2 percent). The indigenous 
population has tended to reside in their traditional homelands of the central mountains 
and eastern coast, although there has been migration among younger generations to cities 
for employment in industrial labor (Chi 2001). The state recognizes 14 different tribes, 
yet members belong to at least 60 distinct dialect groups (Simon 2010). Orientations 
towards politic participation and the state also differentiate indigenous groups. For 
example, the Taroko and Seediq maintain a tradition of anti-state resistance while the 
Bunun groups find agency in compliance with the state (Simon 2010). Additionally, the 
design of the indigenous reserved seat system, which was implemented in 1991 as part of 
democratizing constitutional reforms, splits six seats in the Legislative Yuan equally 
between mountain indigenous tribes and plains indigenous tribes. This design has created 
controversy between large and small tribes as the latter claim a structural disadvantage to 
electoral competition over these seats, reducing their ability to gain representation (Simon 
2010). 
Despite these differences, scholars of Taiwan indigenous politics observe a 
generally strong preference for autonomy following the severe assimilation policies 
enforced by Japanese colonists and then under the authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) from 
1949 until 1991 (Fetzer & Soper 2011; Simon 2010; Stainton 2007). Under Japanese 
                                                 
15
 Simon (2010) further subdivides the native Taiwanese into the Hoklo—whose ancestors came from 
Fujian, China, during the Dutch colonial period and make up about 72 percent of the population—and the 
Hakka—whose ancestors arrived from Guangdong, China, in the 1700s and 1800s and account for around 
13 percent of the population. 
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colonial administration, indigenous people were forced to learn Japanese language and 
culture, and adopt Japanese surnames. These policies were replicated in the “second 
phase of colonialism” (Simon 2010, 730) under Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT which 
mandated the use of Mandarin in schools and promoted Chinese culture; policies which 
contributed to “speed the disappearance of a number of indigenous languages” and 
widespread discrimination of indigenous peoples (Fetzer & Soper 2011, 101). 
As a result of the common experience of colonialism and post-colonial 
subordination by authoritarian government, indigenous people’s movement for self-
government has become a constitutive part of their identity and understood as an inherent 
right (Stainton 2007). While some indigenous legislators have negotiated concessions 
with major parties, these gains have been moderate and unrelated to the core interests of 
political autonomy and land rights while coming at the cost of cooperation with non-
indigenous elites who instrumentalize their party’s relationship with indigenous peoples 
for electoral advantage (Fetzer & Soper 2011). For instance, the constitutional revisions 
made from 1991 to 1993 established the legal framework for indigenous autonomy, but 
the existence of constitutional principles of self-government has not necessarily led to the 
practical implementation of indigenous self-government (Stainton 2007). Similarly, 
between 1992 and 1996, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaders made statements in 
support of indigenous autonomy and established the Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
within the DPP organizational structure. However, Stainton (2007) notes, the DPP at the 
time was an opposition party and could therefore make promises beyond which it had the 
ability or intent to deliver—a fact revealed when the DPP had an opportunity to deliver 
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on its commitment to indigenous autonomy at the 1996 National Development 
Conference and it failed to do so. 
The KMT’s and DPP’s poor record of representation of indigenous interests 
combined with endemic corruption (locally known as “black and gold” politics for 
gangsters and wealthy elites) facilitated by Taiwan’s electoral system (Clark 2007; Jou 
2009) has contributed to indigenous peoples’ antipathy towards and acceptance of 
institutional democratic politics. As Simon (2010, 731) observed of Taiwan indigenous 
groups, “while eating and drinking, they gossip about and laugh at would-be leaders of 
their communities who collaborate with the wider political system.” Indeed, the 
indigenous peoples of Taiwan historically do not have a concept of a permanent leader or 
hierarchically structured institutions, nor is there widespread ambition to be a candidate 
in parliamentary elections (Simon 2010). On the other hand, Fetzer and Soper (2010) 
report that the KMT has cultivated a relationship with indigenous peoples through 
patronage by, for example, promising provisional autonomy and 32,000 new jobs for 
indigenous peoples in exchange for electoral support as President Ma Ying-jeou did in 
2009. Consequently, there is little support for the formation of an indigenous party due to 
the high assimilation costs this strategy would entail. Instead, most indigenous candidates 
run as independents, under the party label of the KMT, or—less frequently—as DPP 
candidates (Stainton 2007). 
A second complementary yet distinct factor contributing to the lack of indigenous 
party entry and success in Taiwan is the absence of an assimilationist challenge in the 
current democratic period. This absence is in significant part attributable to the salience 
of Taiwan’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China and the critical importance 
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Taiwanese national identity has in relationship to this issue (Fetzer & Soper 2010). Both 
the Pan-Blue coalition (KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party) and the Pan-
Green coalition (DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union) have positioned themselves as 
allies of indigenous peoples in order to legitimize their respective platforms with regard 
to Taiwan’s relationship with China. Hence, mainstream parties have been 
accommodative of indigenous interests and candidates in order to boost their issue 
legitimacy. The Pan-Greens advocate independence from China and strategically seek a 
historical foundation for a non-Chinese identity, making indigenous peoples an attractive 
and valuable symbolic ally (Brown 2004). On the other hand, the Pan-Blues are generally 
accommodative of China and claim for themselves “a historical role as protector of 
indigenous peoples” (Simon 2010, 732). In this context, indigenous peoples in Taiwan 
tend to see their participation in formal politics as signaling complicity with the use of 
their ethnic identity as a discursive tool by mainstream elites (Simon 2010). 
Further deterring a robust assimilationist challenge has been the competitiveness 
of national elections. Clark (2007) traces the development of Taiwan’s party system: 
While the KMT started out dominating in the initial years of democratic elections, their 
vote share steadily declined throughout the 1990s. The 2000 presidential election was a 
shock to the party system, as the independent James Soong challenged the KMT 
candidate Lien Chan and the DPP nominee Chen Shui-bian. Chen finished victorious 
with 39.3% of the vote over Soong’s 36.8% and Lien’s 23%. In the aftermath, Soong’s 
supporters and KMT loyalists argued with each other about responsibility for the loss, 
leading to party splits and a reorganization of the party system into Pan-Green and Pan-
Blue blocs. Polarization increased between the blocs from the mid-2000s, driven by a 
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divided government and tight (within five percentage points) presidential and legislative 
elections. Thus, the symbolic value of indigenous identity to mainstream parties and the 
competitiveness of elections have resulted in a system of party competition which 
assuages mainstream parties from adopting assimilation policies. Subsequently, the 
assimilation cost of non-formation has remained lower than the assimilation cost 
associated with formation of an indigenous party. 
In sum, the mainstream parties (or blocs) in Taiwan are deterred from pursuing 
assimilationist challenges for several reasons. These include, first, the competitiveness of 
legislative and presidential elections between the two blocs, and, second, the importance 
held for each party by their relationship with the indigenous peoples due to the symbolic 
value of indigenous identity for posturing on the major cleavages in Taiwanese politics—
that is national identity and the relationship with the People’s Republic of China. 
Consequently, the KMT and DPP parties have the institutional capacity to make an 
assimilationist challenge (i.e., they are decisive actors according to their position in the 
executive or legislative branches), but are effectively weak due to the aforementioned 
factors. Thus, either no assimilation policy is implemented or horizontal accountability in 
favor of indigenous autonomy is respected, reflecting the equilibrium outcomes depicted 
in Panel 3 of Figure 2 and providing support for H3. 
Last, the generally synchronous accommodationist stances of both Pan-Blue and 
Pan-Green coalitions towards indigenous interests meant that any new party that did form 
would have very little success in capturing a significant number of votes. Indeed, as data 
from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (Kollman et al. 2018) indicate, the 
Chinese Taiwan Aborigines Party consistently failed to win more than 0.1 percent of the 
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vote between 1995 and 2001, supporting H6. However, due to the Chinese Taiwan 
Aborigines Party’s apparent lack of importance to Taiwanese elections and party 
competition,
16
 the evidence in support of H6 is only tentative. Furthermore, although the 
structural and institutional conditions—numerous tribes, even more dialect groups, 
divided between plains and mountain indigenous peoples, and within these populations 
conflict between small and large tribes over the fairness of the current reserved seat 
system—theoretically align with the expectation of low electoral success of indigenous 
parties due to heterogeneity cross-cutting electoral institutions, this case study does not 
provide substantial evidence one way or the other to fairly evaluate H4 owing to the lack 
of indigenous party entry. 
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 It may be surprising to see mention of an indigenous party immediately after concluding that no such 
party has formed in the case of Taiwan as predicted by my model. However, I do not consider the existence 
of the Chinese Taiwan Aborigines Party to count as evidence against my theory for two reasons. First, 
existing parties and elections literature often sets a minimum threshold of 1 percent of the popular vote in 
order for a party to be included in the data (e.g., Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994). Second, in none of the 
literature reviewed for this case study or indigenous parties generally was the Chinese Taiwan Aborigines 
Party mentioned. Of course this does not necessarily mean that the party is ephemeral or unimportant, but 
there is no evidence to the contrary while convention and vote totals provided by the CLEA compiled by 
Kollman et al. (2018) indicate the party is not a serious factor in elections. Its inclusion here is only 





I have introduced a game theoretic model of indigenous party entry and developed 
theoretical links between the reputational effects of the strategic decisions made by the 
game players and new indigenous party success. Specifically, I argued that indigenous 
groups prefer autonomy and strong, favorable horizontal accountability institutions to 
secure group rights while established mainstream parties prefer indigenous group 
assimilation through acquiescence to the extension of state authority or, if not, then 
through indigenous group entry into party competition. By reconceptualizing the costs of 
entry to account for indigenous group demands for autonomy, my model provides an 
explanation for the lack of indigenous party formation even when electoral institutions 
are optimally designed for reducing the electoral system cost factor—as in the case of 
reserved seats. This research also examines the strategic balancing act performed by 
indigenous groups between maintaining their autonomy and supporting formal 
institutions which secure group autonomy against government threats. Modelling this 
strategic decision-making process helps to fill the gap in ethnic politics and comparative 
parties literature identified by Bird (2014) and Dunning and Nilekani (2013) about the 
interactive effects of group mobilization and institutional environment on ethnic party 
formation and voter behavior. 
A second contribution of my model is its recognition of how established 
mainstream parties can strategically manufacture a failure of horizontal accountability in 
order to coerce indigenous groups into assimilation via party formation. This recognition 
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is helped by the adoption of a postcolonial lens in the review and construction of a 
rational choice model of indigenous party formation. In contrast to some parties and 
elections research which uses ethnicity as a convenience variable to represent exogenous 
social cleavages (e.g., Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994), I do away with the assumption of 
fixed, homogenous identity groups and incorporate institutional and historical context 
into the study of party formation. This approach improves understanding of the 
motivations and available strategies to actors in the game of indigenous party formation, 
and therefore directly impacts the quality of theoretical models. 
Finally, I theorize how main opposition party orientation towards the new 
indigenous party, and how whether the governing party or the indigenous party rejected 
horizontal accountability, affects issue legitimacy and ownership in regards to indigenous 
autonomy and—subsequently—new indigenous party success. Existing empirical 
research on party entry and success (e.g., Bernauer & Bochsler 2011; Hug 2001) 
prioritizes discussion of methodological concerns over the link between formation and 
electoral success due to the inherent selection bias in the sample of new parties (resulting 
from potential new parties self-selecting into or out of the pool of actually new parties). 
Consequently, variation in electoral outcomes is observed, but the theoretical 
explanations in terms of the causal factors leading to party entry are underdeveloped (e.g., 
Meguid 2005). My theory of indigenous party formation and success contributes to this 
theoretical gap in the literature by articulating a substantive relationship between the 
decisions made during the game of party formation and the electoral outcomes of new 
indigenous parties. The hypotheses implied by my theory were tested using a diverse case 
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study method. Overall, the results provided support for my model of indigenous party 
entry and success. 
However, it is also worth noting some limitations of this theory and empirical 
approach so that the inferences drawn here are appropriately measured and to give initial 
direction to future research about how the model and method may be improved. First, I 
have not incorporated into the game of indigenous party entry conditions about the 
overall duration of the game and time between decision-points, nor have I attempted to 
explain why the established party contemplates issuing an assimilationist challenge when 
it does. It may be worth revising the model, for example, to account for the New Zealand 
Labour Party’s delay until the early 2000s to initiate a strong assimilationist challenge 
and refusal of horizontal accountability. Additionally, despite the improvement made 
upon most similar and most different case study designs, the diverse case study method is 
still a small-N approach and cannot provide the same extent of generalizability as a large-
N test. Thus, future iterations of this research would benefit from employing a large-N 
quantitative component to improve the external validity of the results. This may also help 
to control for other demographic factors such as the size of the indigenous population. 
Last, a more thorough investigation of the theoretical and empirical relationship between 
the strategic decisions leading to party entry and the electoral outcomes for that new party 
would be worthwhile. Although I have begun theorizing these links, the method used in 
this research does not test specifically for a causal relationship between legitimacy 
penalties or rewards and new indigenous party success. Future research could take 
advantage of content analysis, discourse analysis, and survey methods to explicitly test 
for such effects. 
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In closing, there are two implications of this study of indigenous party formation 
and success that require discussion. First, this research speaks in a critical tongue to the 
debate over the optimal design of democratic institutions for the purpose of maximizing 
regime stability. While some advocate a consociational approach (Lijphart 1977) and 
others focus on encouraging multiethnic electoral coalitions (Horowitz 1985), I argue—
and my model suggests—that liberal democracy is terminally bound to its colonial past. 
Hence, the suggestion to bring marginalized indigenous groups into the fold by extending 
an (coercive) offer to participate in the formal institutions of liberal democratic politics is 
an iron fist in a velvet glove. This research provides evidence of how mainstream elites 
leverage democratic institutions such as reserved seats and courts to enforce assimilation 
of autonomy-desiring indigenous peoples in order to legitimate the postcolonial liberal 
democratic state. Inclusion of underrepresented groups in the centers of power must 
facilitate emancipatory work in order to be a genuine and empowering offer of 
participation. 
The cases studied here present evidence of subaltern disillusionment with the 
liberal democratic form of politics and, on occasion, even indigenous elites as they are 
coopted by the neoliberal agendas of mainstream parties and the incentives inherent to 
incumbency in formal institutions of the postcolonial state. For example, Maori voters 
punished the Maori Party for doing more to represent tribal elites than impoverished 
urban and countryside constituents (Humpage 2017). In Taiwan, Simon (2010, 737) 
describes indigenous ambivalence about participation in an electoral system that “does 
not contribute to indigenous nationalism and may even detract from its legitimacy in the 
eyes of voters who see it as a form of political manipulation.” It is apparent that 
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conventional approaches to improving regime stability and legitimacy—those that rely on 
the design of democratic institutions—are inadequate redress to the structural violence 
and marginalization still experienced in indigenous communities. This is not to say that 
institutions are unimportant, but that scholars must ask who is this research for? Future 
research on the topic of ethnic conflict and regime stability should thus adopt a 
postcolonial lens and position formal institutions and dominant ethnic majorities as the 
objects of investigation, rather than embark upon a teleological interrogation of how to 
best assimilate indigenous peoples into prefigured epistemic and institutional structures. 
The latter approach only serves to replicate the colonial move of justifying violence by 
engaging in the discourse of “civilizing” the irrational Other. 
Consequently, scholars utilizing a rational choice approach in the study of ethnic 
minority party formation should adapt their conceptualizations and rhetorical practices to 
more fully acknowledge the structural inequalities inherent in the subject. My model 
reframes reserved seats from “an incentive” for party formation to an institution which 
imparts a partial cost reduction. More generally, the benefit—in the conventional 
language of rational choice theory—of indigenous party entry is really an opportunity to 
effect a harm mitigation strategy. In this sense, one cannot really speak of a “benefit” as 
such. Applications of rational choice models to the question of indigenous parties should 
demystify residual colonial oppressions embedded in modern democratic institutions, and 
thereby contribute to improving knowledge about indigenous party behavior, and more 
importantly, an emancipatory purpose. 
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Most (II)  bc – c (I)  0 (I)  0 
 (IV)  bc – 2c + l (VIII)  – r + l (VIII)  – r + l 
 (VII)  bc – 3c – 2l (VI)  – r – fs + l (III)  – fs 
 (III)  bw – fw – c (III)  – fs (VI)  – r – fs + l 
 (V)  bw – fw – 2c + l (V)  – r – fs – l (V)  – r – fs – l 
 (VI)  bw – fw – 3c – 2l (VII)  – r – a + l (II)  – a 
 (I)  0 (II)  – a (VII)  – r – a + l 
Least (VIII)  – a – 2c – l (IV)  – r – a – l (IV)  – r – a – l 
Note: H refers to a horizontal accountability institution which adjudicates grievances between indigenous 
groups and the state. The left column represents the rank of outcomes if H has a history of deciding in 
favor of P, and the right column represents the opposite tendency. 
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Table 2. Summary of Case Study Results 
Hypothesis New Zealand Colombia Taiwan 
H1: No indigenous party if 
challenge can be referred to horiz. 
accountability institution. 
Support   
H2: If horiz. acct. institution rules 
against indigenous autonomy, a 





H3: If horiz. acct. institution rules 
for indigenous autonomy, party 
doesn’t form unless mainstream 
party rejects accountability. 
Support  Support 
H4: Electoral success increases if 
indigenous population distributed 
in parallel to electoral system. 
Support Support  
H5: Electoral success increases if 
main opposition is adversarial or 
dismissive towards indigenous. 
Support Support  
H6: Electoral success decreases if 
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To solve the game of indigenous party entry, I use backwards induction to derive 
equilibrium outcomes. Figure 1 may prove a useful reference, as well as the assumptions 
about E’s costs and benefits and P’s costs given by inequalities (1), (2), and (4), 
respectively. 
Beginning with the upper right-hand subgame, where P chooses between 
acceptance at outcome IV and fighting at outcome V, the equilibrium will always be to 
fight: 
 −𝑟 − 𝑓𝑠 − 𝑙  [ ? ]  − 𝑟 − 𝑎 − 𝑙 
−𝑓𝑠 > −𝑎 
(5) 
To solve the lower post-H subgame, note that only the signs on l are flipped positive and 
hence the same direction of the inequality obtains, leading P to again prefer fighting 
(outcome VI) over acceptance (outcome VII). 
Next, E must decide between outcome (VI) and outcome (VIII). Assuming that E 
is strong and able to make credible challenges, implying that 
 𝑏𝑤 − 𝑓𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝑙 > 0 (6) 
then 
 𝑏𝑤 − 𝑓𝑤 − 3𝑐 − 2𝑙  [ ? ]  − 𝑎 − 2𝑐 − 𝑙 (7) 
reduces to 0 > −𝑎, making the rejection of horizontal accountability to reach outcome VI 
the best choice for E. If E is weak at this point in the game, however, then the challenge 
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is not credible, reversing the inequality arrow in inequality (6). Whether outcome VI or 
VIII is preferable now depends on the relative values of E’s strength and the benefits to E 
of indigenous party entry. As E’s strength increases, the utility of accepting horizontal 
accountability increases and outcome VIII becomes more likely. 
Knowing that either outcome V or VI will result if the game proceeds past H, it is 
necessary to determine whether outcome V or VI is preferable to each of E and P in order 
to compare the expected value of post-H payoffs with the pre-H outcome. For P, the 
payoffs are equivalent except that 𝑙 > −𝑙; P prefers outcome VI. As for E, eliminating 
like terms leaves: 
 −2𝑐 + 𝑙 > −3𝑐 − 𝑙 (8) 
Thus, E prefers outcome V. 
At this point the solution bottlenecks at H, which is an exogenous actor and 
whose probability of favoring P and indigenous autonomy is represented by α, and the 
probability of H favoring E and indigenous assimilation is given by 1 − α. Further, the 
pre-H decision-making of E and P depends, in part, on the expected value of post-H 
outcomes. In order to derive these values, I define coefficients for the constants c and l as 
θ and β, respectively. The values of these coefficients vary with α according to: 
 𝜃 = 𝛼 − 3 (9) 
 𝛽 = 2𝛼 − 1 (10) 
Now, given that E is a strong party, it is possible to compare the pre-H payoffs to the 
expected values of the post-H outcomes while varying α. The remaining sections take up 
this task and complete the solution to the game of indigenous party formation. 
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When H is Neutral 
Setting 𝛼 = .5, 𝛽 = 0 and 𝜃 = −2.5. To start with P, outcome III will always be 
preferable to outcome II (−𝑓𝑠 > −𝑎) so the question of whether P refers the challenge to 
a neutral H depends on the relative values of outcomes III and the post-H expected payoff. 
Eliminating the like term −𝑓𝑠, P will prefer outcome III since −𝑟 < 0. 
E prefers to issue an assimilation challenge since as a strong type, the expected 
payoff is necessarily greater than zero. Thus, the equilibrium outcome when H is neutral 
and E is a strong type is either V or VI, depending on the random decision of H. If, on the 
other hand, E is weak and cannot issue a credible challenge, then outcome I is the 
equilibrium solution since 
 𝑏𝑤 − 𝑓𝑤 + 𝜃𝑐 < 0 (11) 
 
When H is Unfavorable to P 
Setting 𝛼 < .5, then for P, −1 ≤ 𝛽 < 0. For E, 0 < 𝛽 ≤ 1, and −2.5 <  𝜃 ≤ −2. Again 
starting with P, outcome III is the preferred outcome since, removing like terms, 
 −𝑟 + 𝛽𝑙 < 0 (12) 
In terms of E as a strong type, 
 𝑏𝑤 − 𝑓𝑤 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝛽𝑙 > 0 (13) 
indicating that the expected value of the challenge post-H is greater than not issuing a 
challenge at all. As a result, the equilibrium outcome when H is unfavorable to P and E is 
a strong type is again either V or VI, depending on H’s ruling. 
The equilibrium differs from the neutral H outcome for a weak E, however. If 
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 𝑏𝑤 + 𝛽𝑙 > 𝑓𝑤 − 𝜃𝑐 (14) 
indicating that the benefits of P’s entry into electoral competition in addition to the 
legitimacy benefit of a favorable (to E) ruling from H outweighs the costs for fighting P 
plus continuing the challenge, then E will issue the challenge. In this case, the 
equilibrium resides at outcome III. 
 
When H is Favorable to P 
Setting 𝛼 > .5, then for P, 0 < 𝛽 ≤ 1. For E, −1 ≤ 𝛽 < 0, and −3 ≤  𝜃 < −2.5. In this 
case, P decides to continue the game by referring the assimilation challenge to H if 
𝛽𝑙 > 𝑟 such that 
 −𝑟 − 𝑓𝑠 − 𝛽𝑙 >  −𝑓𝑠 (15) 
As for E, assuming a strong type making credible challenges, the same condition 
as represented by inequality (13) holds. Thus, the equilibrium outcome for a game where 
H is favorable to P and E is strong is indigenous party formation at either outcome V or 
VI, depending on H’s decision. 
In the instance that E is weak, however, 
 𝑏𝑤 − 𝑓𝑤 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝛽𝑙 < 0 (16) 
and E does not issue an assimilationist challenge in the first place. In this case, the 
equilibrium solution is at outcome I. 
